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Section 920A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides ASIC with a flexible power to ban 
individuals from the Australian financial services industry on a number of grounds. The objective of 
this power is to protect consumers through upholding compliance with the law and adherence to 
professional standards. Banned individuals may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) 
to review the merits of such decisions, and on limited points of law such cases may be further appealed 
to the Federal Court of Australia (FCA). This article analyses the practice of the AAT and the FCA in 
determining challenges to s 920A banning orders. The 50 AAT cases examined in the article provide 
interesting examples of misconduct by financial advisers, stockbrokers and traders, insurance brokers 
and operators of investment schemes. The article shows that whilst the AAT has shown a flexible 
approach in considering the circumstances of each banning (setting aside four bans and varying the 
length of 15 bans), it has nevertheless exhibited a firm approach in the other 31 cases in affirming bans 
following serious misconduct. The article concludes by suggesting some minor reforms to further 
enhance the range of protective enforcement tools available to ASIC.  
 
Introduction  
As Australia’s regulator of companies, financial markets and services, and more recently consumer 
credit, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has extensive powers to enforce 
compliance with the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act)2 and the other legislation it administers. 
One of these significant enforcement tools is s 920A of the Act which enables ASIC to make banning 
orders prohibiting persons from providing financial services, with objectives of upholding compliance 
with the law, professional standards and protecting consumers and investors from such unsuitable 
persons within the financial services industry. A similar protective rationale underlies ASIC’s other 
administrative powers to make banning orders against unsuitable persons in the consumer credit 
industry under s 80 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (the NCCP Act); its 
powers  to disqualify persons who have been involved in the management of two or more failed 
corporations within a seven year period for up to five years under s 206F of the Act; and to apply for 
the cancellation or suspension of the registration of company auditors and liquidators.3  
                                                             
1 The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this article 
2 All references to legislation in this article are to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) unless otherwise specified - 
The law discussed in this article is current as at 1 April 2018 
3 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1292 – which enables ASIC to apply to the Companies Auditors and Liquidators 
Disciplinary Board (CALDB). The Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth) will replace the jurisdiction of CALDB 
in respect of liquidator registration and discipline with committees comprising representatives of ASIC, the 




Since 1992 the corporate regulator’s use of its administrative banning and disqualification powers have 
been subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).4 In reviewing the merits 
of decisions by government agencies, the AAT may affirm, vary or set aside the original decision,5 to 
arrive at the correct or preferable decision based on the information before the Tribunal.6 In limited 
circumstances on questions of law, the AAT’s determinations may be subject to judicial review by the 
Federal Court of Australia (FCA).7 This article analyses the 50 decisions by the AAT that have made 
final determinations8 on the merits of  ASIC’s banning orders since the inception of 920A in July 2001, 
and the small number of FCA decisions which have considered appeals against these AAT decisions. 
These cases provide numerous interesting examples of misconduct by financial advisers, stockbrokers 
and traders, insurance brokers and operators of investment schemes.  
 
Part I of this article overviews the legislative development of the s 920A banning power, including the 
2012 Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) amendments to the provision through the Corporations 
Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Cth), and the amendments which will take effect 
from 1 January 2019 pursuant to the Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial 
Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth). It also examines the key judicial guidance on the protective rationale of 
ASIC’s banning and disqualification powers, which is reflected in ASIC’s regulatory guidance on the 
use of s 920A and its other administrative powers against financial services providers.  
 
Part II analyses the reasoning in the four cases where the AAT set aside four banning orders completely 
by taking a different interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Act to ASIC. In Part III the article 
examines the 15 Tribunal determinations which varied the duration of banning orders, based on 
differing assessments of the seriousness of the misconduct and/or the need for consumers to be protected 
against the likelihood of such misconduct being repeated. Part IV shows that for the 31 banning orders 
which were affirmed, the Tribunals have been mindful of the importance of protecting the investing 
public from potential repetitions of serious misconduct – particularly in cases involving fraud and 
serious breaches of the Act.    
 
                                                             
4 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317B, and previously Corporations Law (Cth) s 1317B 
5 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43 
6 Shi v Migration Agents' Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 at 298–299 and 314-315; (2008) 103 ALD 
467 at 475–476 and 489; (2008) 248 ALR 390 at 398–399 and 412; (2008) 82 ALJR 1147 at 1154–1155 and 
1165; (2008) 48 AAR 345 at 354–356 and 368-369; [2008] HCA 31 at [34] – [39] and [98] – [99]; Drake v 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409  at 419; and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139  at 143 
7 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44  
8 The article does not examine “procedural” Tribunal decisions which have made interim directions about the 




Part V draws together the key observations from the analysis of the AAT and FCA decisions which 
have helped in clarifying the practical meaning of several of the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Act. 
Overall the article concludes that the banning order regime is working well, with the AAT decisions 
ensuring the accountability of ASIC for its administrative enforcement decisions. The article concludes 
by proposing some relatively minor changes to the new provisions of the Act introduced by the 
Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth) (which will 
come into operation on 1 January 2019) to further enhancing the range of ASIC’s enforcement options 
for maintaining professional standards within the Australian financial services industry. 
 
I. Legislative development and ASIC’s use of the s 920A banning power 
 
A. Legislative development and overview of s 920A 
As comprehensively explained by Latimer,9 and by Baxt, Black and Hanrahan,10 legislative provisions 
enabling the suspension and cancellation of licences to operate within the securities industries existed 
in the various state-based Securities Industry Acts since the 1970s. Provisions enabling the corporate 
regulator to make banning orders against individuals were included in the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), 
which was passed by the Commonwealth to apply in the territories and mirrored by State legislation 
under the name of the Corporations Law. The former Corporations Law enabled the Australian 
Securities Commission (ASC), which assumed its present name of ASIC in 1998,11 to make banning 
orders prohibiting natural persons from the securities12 and futures industries.13  
 
Section 920A was enacted through the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), which introduced the 
current Australian Financial Services (AFS) Licensing regime under Part 7.6 of the Act.14 The present 
s 920A has enabled ASIC to make banning orders prohibiting a person from providing financial services 
on a number of grounds, which are discussed below. Significant amendments were made to s 920A 
through the Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Cth) (the 2012 FOFA 
                                                             
9 Paul Latimer ‘Providing financial services “efficiently, honestly and fairly” (2006) 24 Company and Securities 
Law Journal 362 
10 Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 9th Edition 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2017), 30 – 49  
11 As Nehme explains, with the passing of the Financial Services Sector Reform (Amendments and Transitional 
Provisions) Act 1998 (Cth), the ASC’s responsibilities of regulating corporations and the securities industries 
expanded to also encompass consumer protection in the financial sector: Marina Nehme ‘Latest changes to the 
banning order regime: Were the amendments really necessary?’ (2013) 21 Company and Securities Law Journal 
341 
12 Corporations Law (Cth) (repealed) s 829 
13 Corporations Law (Cth) (repealed) s 1193 
14 For a comprehensive overview of the workings of the Australian Financial Services (AFS) Licensing regime, 
see Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 9th Edition 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2017), 511 – 570 
 
 
amendments),15 which introduced new grounds for ASIC to make banning orders and amended several 
of its existing grounds, with effect from 1 July 2012. The background to, and content of, the 2012 FOFA 
amendments have been comprehensively analysed by Marina Nehme, who also provides a useful 
comparison of the wording of s 920A before and after the 2012 FOFA amendments .16  
 
Section s 920A(1B) provides that a person ‘contravenes' a financial services law if they fail to comply 
with a duty imposed under that law, even such failure is not an offence or a civil penalty provision. 
Banning orders made under s 920A may be permanent,17 or for a specified period (unless ASIC has 
reason to believe that the person is not of good fame and character).18 Section 921A also enables the 
court to make banning orders, although to date this power has not been directly applied. 
 
Further amendments to s 920A will come into effect from 1 January 2019 through the Corporations 
Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth) (the 2017 Professional 
Standards Amendments). With two major inquiries in 2014 noting concerns about professional 
standards within the Australian financial services industry (particularly amongst financial advisers),19 
the 2017 Professional Standards Amendments will introduce significant reforms for financial advisers 
who provide personal advice to retail clients (who will be referred to as ‘relevant providers’ these new 
provisions). These changes will include:  
 raising the education requirements for financial advisers from Diploma level to Bachelor degree 
level or higher;  
 the introduction of a common exam to enter the financial advice industry;  
 supervision requirements for new financial advisors, who will be termed ‘provisional relevant 
providers’;  
                                                             
15 The 2012 FOFA reforms were based on the recommendations of the 2009 Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into Financial Products and Services (the 2009 PJC Inquiry). 
Following the collapses of Storm Financial and Opes Prime, the 2009 PJC Inquiry identified concerns about 
shortcomings in the regulation of financial advice (particularly the scope for conflicts of interest through 
commission-based remuneration, and insufficient requirements for financial advisers to prioritise the interests of 
clients over their own interests. For a comprehensive overview of the background to, and details of, the 2012 
FOFA reforms to the provision of financial advice, see Andrew Serpell ‘The future of financial advice reforms’ 
(2012) 30 Company and Securities Law Journal 240 
16 Marina Nehme ‘Latest changes to the banning order regime: Were the amendments really necessary?’ (2013) 
21 Company and Securities Law Journal 341 
17 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 920B(2)(a) 
18 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 920B(2)(b) 
19 These included first the Financial System Inquiry, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Australian 
Government, 7 December 2014) http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/; See also Improving Australia’s 
financial system Government response to the Financial System Inquiry (Commonwealth Treasury, 20 October 
2015); and secondly the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into 
proposals to lift the professional, ethical and education standards in the financial services industry (Australian 
Government, 19 December 2014) 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/Financ
ial_Adviser_Qualifications/Report    
 
 
 mandating ongoing professional development for financial advisors; and  
 the introduction of a code of ethics for the industry.20 
 
The final part of this article considers how these amendments, particularly the requirements for 
‘provisional relevant providers’ to be supervised, might help to reduce the scope for misconduct in the 
financial services industry. 
 
B. ASIC’s other administrative powers in relation to financial services misconduct  
In addition to its power to ban individuals under s 920A, ASIC may also suspend or cancel an AFS 
Licence under s 915C, with such decisions also being reviewable by the AAT. Additionally, as an 
alternative to pursuing administrative or civil sanctions, ASIC may also accept enforceable 
undertakings from companies, individuals and licensees under the various legislation it administers.21.22 
ASIC’s policy on the use of enforceable undertakings is set out in its Regulatory Guide 100, which 
specifies the factors ASIC will consider when determining the appropriateness its response to identified 
misconduct or breaches of legislation.23 Whilst the AAT has previously accepted two enforceable 
undertakings in lieu of banning orders made under s 829 of the former Corporations Law,24 as Parts III 
and IV of this article note the Tribunals in nine cases rejected submissions for banning orders to be set 
aside and replaced by enforceable undertakings; and in one case where the Tribunal varied the s 920A 
ban to an enforceable undertaking, the original banning order was reinstated by the Tribunal following 
ASIC’s appeal to the FCA.25 
 
                                                             
20 For an overview of these changes see Robin Bowley ‘Regulating the financial advice profession: An 
examination of recent developments in Australia, New Zealand  and the United Kingdom and recommendations 
for further reform’ (2017) 36 University of Queensland Law Journal 191 - 193  
21 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 93AA. ASIC may also accept Enforceable 
Undertakings from responsible entities of registered schemes under s 92A of the ASIC Act 2001 (Cth) , and under 
s 322 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) in relation to matters concerning consumer 
credit 
22 Enforceable undertakings are an administrative settlement which may provide ASIC with a more flexible 
regulatory response to misconduct it identifies, and ASIC’s use of this remedy has been comprehensively 
studied. See for example Helen Bird, George Gilligan and Ian Ramsay ‘The Who, Why and What of 
Enforceable Undertakings Accepted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’ (2016) 34 
Company and Securities Law Journal 491; Marina Nehme ‘Enforceable Undertakings: Are they Procedurally 
Fair?’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 471; ‘Enforceable Undertaking: A restorative Sanction’ (2010) 36 Monash 
University Law Review 108; ‘Monitoring Compliance with Enforceable Undertakings’ (2009) 23 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 76; and ‘Expansion of the Powers of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Relation 
to Enforceable Undertakings’ (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 116 
23 ASIC Regulatory Guide 100 Enforceable Undertakings – with Section C providing guidance on the 
circumstances under which ASIC may consider accepting an Enforceable Undertaking as an alternative to other 
enforcement action  
24 See for example Re Donald and ASIC (2001) 64 ALD 717; (2001) 38 ACSR 661; [2001] AATA 622 and 
Daws and ASIC (2006) 91 ALD 138; [2006] AATA 246. For commentary on these two decisions see Marina 
Nehme ‘Expansion of the Powers of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Relation to Enforceable 
Undertakings (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 116 
25 Caines and ASIC [2012] AATA 289, which is discussed in Part IV below  
 
 
ASIC’s practice is for administrative decisions such as s 920A banning orders and s 915C AFS Licence 
suspensions and cancellations to be made by an authorised delegate of the Commission (who has not 
previously been involved in investigating the matter), after providing the affected person with an 
opportunity for a hearing.26 The constitutional validity of ASIC’s administrative enforcement powers 
appears to be beyond challenge, following the 2007 High Court decision of Visnic v ASIC.27 In Visnic, 
the High Court unanimously held that s 206F of the Act did not invalidly confer the judicial power of 
the Commonwealth upon ASIC, due to the disciplinary (rather than judicial) character of s 206F 
disqualification orders as a means of maintaining professional standards in the management of 
corporations. Visnic v ASIC (2007) was heard concurrently with Albarran v Members of the Companies’ 
Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board; Gould v Magarey (2007)28 – where the High Court also 
unanimously dismissed similar arguments about s 1292 invalidly conferring the judicial powers of the 
Commonwealth on the Board through enabling it to suspend or cancel the registration of liquidators.  
 
C. Factors in determining the justification and length of banning orders 
Whilst as Parts III and IV explain, determining the appropriate length of banning orders has proven 
challenging both for ASIC and for the AAT, the reasoning of Santow J in ASIC v Adler  (2002) has 
provided valuable guidance. In considering the length of disqualifications to be imposed under ss 206C 
and 206E of the Act on former directors of HIH, his Honour summarised 15 key propositions from 
previous case law on the rationale for, and appropriate length of, disqualification orders against persons 
from managing companies. Whilst emphasising the primary focus of disqualification orders was the 
protection of stakeholders who deal with companies rather than the punishment of the disqualified 
individual, His Honour also reasoned that both general and personal deterrence, and preventing future 
misuse of the corporate structure, were relevant considerations in the imposition of a disqualification 
order. His Honour also identified factors which may be relevant in the decision to impose short periods 
of disqualification of up to three years, medium disqualification periods of between seven to twelve 
years, and lengthy periods of 25 years or more.29 
 
Justice Santow’s 15 propositions are well accepted in Australian corporate law, having been cited with 
approval by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Elliott v ASIC (2004),30 and by McHugh J in his separate 
                                                             
26 ASIC’s practice in relation to administrative hearings is set out in Regulatory Guide 8 ‘Hearings practice 
manual’ (updated 1 March 2002) http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1236863/rg8.pdf  
27 Visnic v ASIC (2007) 231 CLR 381; (2007) 95 ALD 18; (2007) 234 ALR 413; (2007) 81 ALJR 1175; (2007) 
61 ACSR 512; (2007) 25 ACLC 775; [2007] HCA 24 
28 Albarran v Members of the CALDB; Gould v Magarey (2007) 231 CLR 350; (2007) 95 ALD 220; (2007) 234 
ALR 618; (2007) 81 ALJR 1155; (2007) 61 ACSR 487; (2007) 25 ACLC 756; [2007] HCA 23 
29 ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80 at 97 – 99; (2002) 20 ACLC 1146 at 1159 –1160; [2002] NSWSC 483 at [56] 
30 Elliott v ASIC; Plymin v ASIC (2004) 10 VR 369 at 406 – 407; (2004) 205 ALR 594 at 630 – 631; (2004) 185 




but concurring judgment in Rich v ASIC (2004).31 The 15 propositions have also been incorporated into 
ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 98 (RG 98),32 which outlines ASIC’s policy on administrative action against 
participants in the financial services industry – including both banning orders against individuals under 
s 920A and suspensions and/or cancellations of AFS licences under s 915C. With its additional 
responsibilities for regulating consumer credit since 2009, ASIC has published similar regulatory 
guidance on its approach to taking administrative action against participants in the consumer credit 
industry in its Regulatory Guide 218.33 RG 98 explains that ASIC’s decision to take administrative 
action will depend on the circumstances of each case. Table 1 of RG 98 lists the factors ASIC may 
consider when determining whether to take administrative action – either in conjunction with, or as an 
alternative to, pursuing civil or criminal remedies. These factors include:  
 Nature and seriousness of the suspected misconduct; 
 Internal controls; 
 Conduct after the alleged contravention occurs; 
 The expected level of public benefit; 
 Likelihood that: (i) the person’s or entity’s behaviour will change in response to a particular 
action; and (ii) the business community is generally deterred from similar conduct through 
greater awareness of its consequences; and 
 Mitigating factors.34 
 
Table 2 of RG 98 draws upon the 15 propositions formulated by Santow J in ASIC v Adler (2002) to 
provide a non-exhaustive list of factors which ASIC may take into account in determining the 
appropriate length of banning orders. These factors (together with a number of indicative examples) are 
grouped into the circumstances warranting short periods of banning for less than three years; 
intermediate bans of between three to ten years; and lengthy bans for periods of ten years or more 
(including permanent bans).35  
 
As Table A below shows, ASIC has consistently exercised its administrative banning and AFS Licence 
suspension and cancellation powers over the years since 2001.36  
                                                             
31 Rich v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129 at 152 –156; (2004) 209 ALR 271 at 287 – 289; (2004) 78 ALJR 1354 at 
1365 – 1367; (2004) 50 ACSR 242 at 258 – 260; (2004) 22 ACLC 1198 at 1210 – 1211; [2004] HCA 42 at [48] 
– [52] 
32 ASIC Regulatory Guide 98 Licensing: Administrative action against financial services providers (30 July 2013) 
33 ASIC Regulatory Guide 218 Licensing: Administrative action against persons engaging in credit activities 
(November 2010) 
34 ASIC Regulatory Guide 98, 16 Table 1 ‘Key factors we consider in deciding to take administrative action’ 
35 ASIC Regulatory Guide 98, 17 – 18 Table 2 ‘Factors and examples of conduct relating to specific periods of 
banning’  
36 ASIC’s practice has been to report the total number of administrative actions against both individuals 
(including banning orders under s 920A) and against licensees (including AFS Licence suspensions and/or 




Table 1: ASIC’s yearly administrative actions against financial services industry participants  
  
Year 
People / companies banned from 
providing financial services  
ASIC Annual report page reference 
2016-2017 100 2016-2017 Annual Report p. 32 
2015-2016 81 2015-2016 Annual Report p. 32 
2014-2015 53 2014-2015 Annual Report p. 7 
2013-2014 57 2013-2014 Annual Report p. 7 
2012-2013 50 2012-2013 Annual Report p. 18 
2011-2012 54 2011-2012 Annual Report p. 151 
2010-2011 64 2010-2011 Annual Report p. 87 
2009-2010 41 2009-2010 Annual Report p. 19 
2008-2009 47 2008-2009 Annual Report p. 19 
2007-2008 49 2007-2008 Annual Report p. 16 
2006-2007 37 2006-2007 Annual Report p. 19 
2005-2006 27 2005-2006 Annual Report p. 18 
2004-2005 25 2004-2005 Annual Report p. 14 
2003-2004 42 2003-2004 Annual Report p. 12 
2002-2003 39 2002-2003 Annual Report p. 14 
2001-2002 35 2001-2002 Annual Report p. 14 
 
 
Whilst the Tribunal is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses when reviewing the merits of 
decisions by government agencies,37 Parts II to IV below explain that most of the Tribunal decisions on 
challenges to s 920A banning orders have considered the factors outlined in Table 2 of RG 98. Whilst 
in several instances the Tribunals have formed a different view to that of the original ASIC delegate, 
RG 98 has not been criticised by any of the Tribunals.   
 
The importance of a robust system of external merits review has been recognised by academic 
commentators as a means of ensuring the accountability of ASIC’s use of its enforcement powers.38 In 
                                                             
2007 (where ASIC reported 35 920A banning orders) and 2008-2009 (where ASIC reported 42 s 920A banning 
orders). For a comprehensive review of ASIC’s practice in imposing banning orders, see Jasper Hedges, George 
Gilligan and Ian Ramsay ‘Banning Orders: An Empirical Analysis of the Dominant Mode of Corporate Law 
Enforcement in Australia’ (2017) 39 Sydney Law Review 501  
37 Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) [1979] AATA 179; (1980) 2 ALD 634 at 
642 per Brennan J.  
38 See for example Margaret Hyland ‘Is ASIC sufficiently accountable for its administrative decisions? A question 
of review’ (2010) 28 Company and Securities Law Journal 32, 52 (pointing out that external merits review can 
assist in enhancing the credibility and acceptance of ASIC’s administrative determinations in cases where an 
independent body such as the AAT reaches the same conclusion to ASIC); and Joanna Bird ‘Regulating the 
Regulators: Accountability of Australian Regulators’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 739, 748 
(noting concerns about the possibility that in reviewing the merits of ASIC determinations, the AAT may not be 
best placed to take account of the broader regulatory objectives that ASIC is aiming to achieve).   
 
 
reviewing the merits of banning orders made under s 920A, the Tribunal may exercise all of the powers 
and discretions conferred upon the ASIC delegate as the original decision-maker. Through standing in 
the shoes of the original decision-maker, the function of the Tribunal is to arrive at the correct or 
preferable decision based on the material before it, which may include the consideration of fresh material 
tendered by an applicant or by ASIC.39  
 
The challenges of deriving generally-applicable principles on the justification for, and appropriate 
durations of disqualification from earlier cases in light of the variations in the circumstances of 
individual cases have been widely recognised.40 As discussed in the sections below, these challenges 
are certainly applicable in the case of s 920A banning orders involving market misconduct – several of 
which have involved the Tribunals (and in several cases the courts) considering the preferable 
interpretation of the complex provisions of the applicable legislation. For each decision Table B at the 
end of this article summarises the relevant legislative provisions which ASIC found to have been 
breached, the s 920A grounds invoked by ASIC when imposing the ban, the  original ban imposed by 
ASIC and the decision of the Tribunal.   
 
II. Section 920A banning orders set aside     
 
Four s 920A banning orders have been set aside completely on account of the Tribunals either taking a 
different interpretation to ASIC about the meaning of the applicable legislation.  
 
A. Misleading or deceptive conduct in the making of unsolicited offers to purchase shares 
In Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514, Deputy President Forgie set aside ASIC’s 
permanent banning of Mr David Tweed – with this decision representing the most significant variation 
to ASIC’s original banning order out of all the 50 Tribunal decisions examined in this article. Through 
his opportunistic and predatory practices of making unsolicited offers to acquire shares from financially 
unsophisticated shareholders, Mr Tweed’s companies had previously been subject to civil actions by 
ASIC in the FCA. ASIC’s delegate had imposed a permanent ban against Mr Tweed on the basis that 
as the sole director, secretary and responsible officer of Country Estate and Agency Company Pty Ltd 
                                                             
39 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 at 419; Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139  at 143; Shi v Migration Agents' Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 
286 at 298 – 299 and 314 – 315; (2008) 103 ALD 467 at 475 – 476 and 489; (2008) 248 ALR 390 at 398 – 399 
and 412; (2008) 82 ALJR 1147 at 1154 – 1155 and 1165; (2008) 48 AAR 345 at 354 – 356 and 368 – 369; [2008] 
HCA 31 at [34] – [39] and [98] – [99]   
40 See for example McCormack and ASIC [2016] AATA 1021 at [60], citing the remarks of McHugh J in Rich v 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129 at 155 
 
 
(which held an AFS Licence), he had failed to comply with financial services laws through causing his 
associated company National Exchange Pty Ltd41 to:  
 Engage in misleading or deceptive conduct regarding the making of unsolicited offers to 
purchase shares in OneSteel Ltd in July 2003 (in breach of s 1041H); 
 Fail to send offers in October 2004 to shareholders of Aevum Ltd  as soon as practicable after 
the date of the offers (in breach of s 1019E(2)); and   
 Make offers to shareholders of Aevum Ltd during October 2004 that were not expressed to 
remain open for at least one month (in breach of s 1019G(2).42 
 
Deputy President Forgie  reasoned that whilst Mr Tweed’s companies had been found to have 
contravened s 1041H43 and ss 1019E(2) and 1019G(2),44 it did not follow that Mr Tweed had personally 
breached these provisions.45 She reasoned that in his capacity as the sole director and shareholder of 
National Exchange, Mr Tweed was not personally carrying on a financial services business.46  
Noting that ASIC did not have the power to interfere with an AFS licensee's choice of a representatives, 
Forgie DP concluded that  a banning order would not prevent Mr Tweed (or one of his companies) from 
making unsolicited offers which complied with the procedural requirements of ss 1019E(2) and 
1019G(2).47 However as Austin and Black explain,48 following a Treasury consultation process,49 s 
1019G(2) was amended in 2010 to require unsolicited offers to purchase financial products off-market 
to remain open for at least one month after the date of the offer.50 It is also relevant to consider that by 
introducing the new grounds of being ‘involved’ in a financial services law contravention through ss 
920A(1)(g) and (h), the 2012 amendments to s 920A (reviewed in IA above) might produce a different 
outcome in response to similar conduct in the future.  
 
B. Misleading investment promotions 
In De Souza and ASIC [2009] AATA 725, the Tribunal set aside ASIC’s two year banning of the former 
director of Finance Professionals Alliance Pty Ltd (FPA) (which held an AFS Licence), and of FPA’s 
                                                             
41 The Tribunal noted that Mr Tweed was the sole director and shareholder of these companies, as well as several 
others: Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 at [7] – [9]. 
42 Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 at [7] – [61]. Following this decision, s 1019G was 
amended by the Corporations Amendment (No. 1) Act 2010 (Cth), requiring such offers to be kept open for a 
minimum of one month. 
43 ASIC v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2003) 202 ALR 24; 47 ACSR 128; [2003] FCA 955 
44 Aevum Pty Ltd v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2004) 142 FCR 316; 23 ACLC 287; [2004] FCA 1781 
45 Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 at [97] – [103] 
46 Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 at [113] 
47 Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 at [162] - [169] 
48 Robert Austin and Ashley Black Austin & Black’s Annotations to the Corporations Act [7.1019C] – 
Annotations to sections 1019C-1019K (LexisNexis Online, 2017) 
49 Treasury Access to Share Registers in the Regulation of Unsolicited Off-Market Offers (May 2009) 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1548 , which resulted from concerns expressed by 
Emmet J in Aevum Pty Ltd v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2004) 142 FCR 316; 23 ACLC 287; [2004] FCA 1781 
50 Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act 2010 
 
 
corporate authorised representative Corporate Capital Securities Pty Ltd (CCS). CCS published an 
online subscription newsletter The Active Investor, which provided stock analysis recommendations 
and promoted investments through private placements. During early 2006 The Active Investor promoted 
an exclusive placement of shares in a mining company; however several investors who paid a $595 
membership to The Active Investor never received the promised allocation of shares. ASIC’s 
investigation found CCS had breached ss 727 and 734 by offering shares in the mining company without 
providing its prospectus; that it made misleading claims on its website about its trading history and the 
scale of operations; and that FPA had failed to ensure that CCS complied with financial services laws. 
ASIC’s delegate found these breaches indicated that Mr De Souza would not comply with financial 
services laws, and banned him for two years under s 920A(1)(f).51 Whilst expressing concerns about 
his failure to effectively supervise CCS’s operational activities, Member Frost held that according to 
(the pre-2012) wording of s 920A(1)(f), there were insufficient grounds for believing that Mr De Souza 
would ‘not comply’ with a financial services law in the future – reasoning that the provision focused 
on what the relevant person would do in the future, rather than what he or she might do.52  
 
C. Unauthorised share trading by employees of AFS licensees  
In XTWK and ASIC (2008) 105 ALD 596; [2008] AATA 703, the Tribunal set aside ASIC’s three year 
banning of a stockbroker. The stockbroker XTWK53 had been employed in a corporate group by 
Company A, which was a subsidiary and authorised representative of Company B (which held an AFS 
Licence). An internal investigation found XTWK had caused Company B to enter into an ASX 
transaction without disclosing to the buyer that Company B was acting on its own behalf. The internal 
investigation also found XTWK had breached internal staff rules through his unapproved personal share 
trading, for which his employment was terminated. ASIC’s delegate found XTWK’s trading had 
contravened s 991F(3) and the former ASX Market Rule 7.8.2,54 and imposed a three year ban under ss 
920A(1)(e) and 920A(1)(f).55 
 
However after finding XTWK to be an employee of Company A, and that it was Company B as a market 
participant (not XTWK as an individual) that breached s 991F(3) and ASX Market Rule 7.8.2, Member 
Fice concluded that XTWK had not breached a ‘financial services law’ as contended by ASIC.56 Rather, 
                                                             
51 De Souza and ASIC [2009] AATA 725 at [1] – [27]; ASIC Media Release 07-97 ‘ASIC bans three NSW finance 
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52 De Souza and ASIC [2009] AATA 725 at [30] – [35] 
53 Under s 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal may make directions in relation 
to hearings which may include suppressing the identity of the applicants 
54 ASX Market Rule 7.8.2 detailed he requirements for employees of ASX Market Participants to gain consent for 
their personal trading. As a result of the Corporations Amendment (Financial Market Supervision) Act 2010 (Cth), 
the ASX Market Rules were replaced by the ASIC Market Integrity Rules 
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the only breach he found to be substantiated was XTWK’s breach of internal staff dealing rules.57 The 
Tribunal then noted that since leaving Company A, XTWK had gained employment with another 
market participant (Company C) after disclosing the reasons for his departure from Company A, and 
having transferred his personal share account to a stockbroker approved by Company C, in accordance 
with its staff dealing rules. In finding XTWK had ‘learnt his lesson’ from his earlier conduct; that the 
grounds to ban him under s 920A(1)(f) had not been established;58 and that XTWK’s trading had not 
caused any detriment, the Tribunal concluded the ban was not necessary to protect the public, and that 
XTWK’s dismissal from Company A would have a sufficient effect of general deterrence.59 
 
D. Market manipulation    
The market manipulation provisions of the Act in ss 1041A and 1041B have been noted for their legal 
complexity.60 Both the following case, and the cases discussed in Part IVE of this article, illustrate the 
challenges of interpreting these complex provisions.  
 
In Rosenberg and ASIC [2010] AATA 654; (2010) 117 ALD 582, Handley DP set aside ASIC’s four 
year banning of the Managing Director the Tricom group of companies which included the stockbroking 
firm Tricom Equities Ltd. Tricom’s stockbroking business had involved its clients lending securities to 
Tricom as collateral for cash loans. During the market volatility of early 2008, Tricom’s Managing 
Director Mr Rosenberg became aware that Opes Prime (one of Tricom’s corporate lenders) was 
experiencing significant financial difficulties, and was concerned to manage the impact of this on 
Tricom’s business. Acting on expert advice, he authorised the selling of the on-lent securities by Opes 
Prime through 12 special crossing trades on the ASX between Tricom Equities as the seller and Tricom 
Holdings Ltd as the purchaser. However three days after placing these trades, having obtained the 
necessary finance from other lenders to purchase the on-lent securities, Mr Rosenberg advised the ASX 
that the 12 special crossings would be cancelled the next day.61 ASIC determined that through placing 
the buy and sell instructions for the 12 special crossings, Mr Rosenberg had breached s 1041B(1) 
through creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading. ASIC’s delegate characterised Mr 
Rosenberg’s decision to proceed with the special crossings as a ‘contrivance entered into for the primary 
purpose of stimulating a response that might have resulted in the recall of Tricom stock’,62 and found 
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58 XTWK and ASIC (2008) 105 ALD 596; [2008] AATA 703 at [71] 
59 XTWK and ASIC (2008) 105 ALD 596; [2008] AATA 703 at [74] – [75] 
60 See for example Ashley Black ‘Insider trading and market misconduct’ (2011) 29 Company and Securities 
Law Journal 313; Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 9th 
Edition (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2017), 665 – 702; Paul Constable ‘Ferocious beast or toothless tiger? The 
regulation of stock market manipulation in Australia’ (2011) 8 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 54;  Hui 
Huang ‘Redefining market manipulation in Australia: The role of an implied intent element’ (2009) 27 
Company and Securities Law Journal 8 
61 Rosenberg and ASIC (2010) 117 ALD 582; [2010] AATA 654 at [1] – [18]  
62 Rosenberg and ASIC (2010) 117 ALD 582; [2010] AATA 654 at [22] 
 
 
his decision to proceed with these trades demonstrated recklessness as to whether Tricom would be in 
a position to settle these trades three business days after the transaction was entered into, as required by 
the ASX Market Rules at the time.63 In determining this trading to be manipulative, ASIC’s delegate 
imposed a four year ban.64 
 
However the Tribunal took a different view of these transactions, noting that s 1041B(1)(a) focused on 
appearance of active trading on a financial market – in contrast to the special crossings which were 
transacted off-market.65 The Tribunal noted that the special crossings were transacted at prices which 
markedly differed from the market price at the close of the previous day’s trading, and that the change 
in market price on the next trading day was relatively insignificant and attributable to news regarding 
the appointment of receivers to Opes Prime.66 In also noting that Mr Rosenberg sought expert advice 
before placing the instructions for these trades in the urgent circumstances at the time,67 Handley DP 
set aside ASIC’s banning order.     
 
III. Variations to s 920A banning orders    
 
In the following cases the lengths of s 920A banning orders were varied after the Tribunals differed in 
their assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct and/or the need for consumer protection. 
 
A.  Minimal need of protecting the consumers from isolated transgressions  
Firstly, in Dollas-Ford and ASIC (2006) 91 ALD 747; [2006] AATA 704 a financial advisor who had 
worked in the life and superannuation industries since 1979 forged the signatures of a couple who were 
her clients whilst they were uncontactable overseas, in order to preserve their positions in a 
superannuation fund pending discussions with them. ASIC considered Ms Dollas-Ford’s actions 
amounted to dishonest conduct under s 1041G, and that she was not of ‘good fame and character’ for 
the purposes of s 920B(2). Whilst Senior Member Penglis agreed Ms Dollas-Ford’s misconduct had 
been dishonest, he found her actions did not involve any intent to defraud, and that no losses were 
experienced by her clients. After noting Ms Dollas-Ford’s numerous character references her otherwise 
unblemished record, and her acceptance of responsibility for her actions, the Tribunal determined there 
                                                             
63 The Tribunal noted that: ‘Section 5.7.3 of the ASX Market Rules imposes an obligation on the parties to settle 
the transaction at a settlement date that is three business days after the transaction was entered into, referred to as 
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[2010] AATA 654 at [13]  
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65 Rosenberg and ASIC (2010) 117 ALD 582; [2010] AATA 654 at [38], [95] 
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was no risk of her engaging in similar misconduct in the future and concluded a reduced ban of four 
years was appropriate in the circumstances.68 
 
Secondly in JTMJ and ASIC [2010] AATA 350, originated from ASIC’s ten year banning of a 
stockbroker. ASIC’s delegate had determined that the stockbroker had breached s 1041A through two 
transactions executed on behalf of a client over two days, which were well outside the high and low 
limits of the trading in the shares concerned.69 Deputy President Forgie also expressed concerns about 
the adequacy of JTMJ’s recording of instructions for the transactions he executed,70 and indeed found 
he had breached s 1101F(1A) through not recording instructions from a client to place the trades which 
were found to be manipulative.71 Forgie DP determined JTMJ’s failure to maintain the required records 
for his trades demonstrated a lack of concern for financial services laws, thus engaging s 920A(1)(f).72 
After rejecting JTMJ’s arguments about the alternative option of an enforceable undertaking,73 the 
Tribunal concluded a banning order was warranted to protect the public from a repetition of such 
misconduct. However, after noting that JTMJ’s manipulative trading involved only two breaches and 
one client, his lack of previous contraventions and good community standing, Forgie DP concluded 
ASIC’s ten year ban would have a punitive effect  by effectively precluding JTMJ from resuming his 
career in the financial services industry, and varied the ban to three years.74  
 
Thirdly, in George and ASIC [2014] AATA 167, ASIC had permanently banned a mortgage broker 
who had falsified loan approval documentation for five of his clients.  ASIC determined Mr George 
was not of good fame and character under s 920A(1)(d), and that he was also not a fit and proper person 
to engage in credit activities under s 80(1)(f) of the NCCP Act.75 Mr George submitted that his 
misconduct in falsifying employment documentation relating to applications for “deposit guarantees” 
(a substitute for a cash deposit for purchases of homes) took place between late 2010 and mid-2011, 
when he had experienced two deaths in his family.76 Deputy President Handley noted the Mortgage and 
Finance Association of Australia (MFAA) Tribunal had suspended Mr George’s membership for two 
years,77 and favourable character references from former colleagues with full knowledge of the MFAA 
suspension and of ASIC’s investigation.78 After noting Mr George’s submission that under s 
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70 JTMJ and ASIC [2010] AATA 350 at [191] – [211] 
71 JTMJ and ASIC [2010] AATA 350 at [212] – [215] 
72 JTMJ and ASIC [2010] AATA 350 at [223] – [228] 
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74 JTMJ and ASIC [2010] AATA 350 at [253] – [258] 
75 George and ASIC [2014] AATA 167 at [1] – [6]; ASIC Media Release 14-073 MR ‘AAT varies banning period 
of Edward Richard George’ (9 April 2004)   
76 George and ASIC [2014] AATA 167 at [15] 
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920A(1)(da), a reduced ban could include a condition that he undertake further training and/or that he 
be supervised,79 the Tribunal noted he had worked in mortgage broking for 15 years without incidents, 
and that he had demonstrated genuine remorse for his misconduct.80 After also noting Mr George’s 
cooperation with ASIC’s investigation, and that aside from increasing his clientele he received no direct 
benefit from his misconduct, the Tribunal determined that whilst dishonest, Mr George’s conduct was 
out of character, and varied both the s 920A and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 
(Cth) (NCCP Act) s 80 bans to three years.81 
 
Whilst these three bans were varied, as Part IVA explains in other cases where the contraventions were 
serious and/or repeated, the Tribunals took a much firmer approach in affirming banning orders. 
 
B. Reduced need for personal and general deterrence following criminal convictions  
Two interesting AAT cases considered the interplay between criminal convictions and administrative 
banning orders. The first of these cases was Musumeci and ASIC (2009) 109 ALD 677; [2009] AATA 
524. During 2006 one of Mr Musumeci’s clients, Dr Mervyn Jacobsen who was then the CEO of ASX-
listed Genetic Technologies Ltd (GTG), instructed him to purchase $USD500,000 worth of GTG shares. 
Dr Jacobsen instructed Mr Musumeci of his desire to ensure that GTG’s closing price remained at or 
above $0.35, which he duly followed. Dr Jacobsen was subsequently convicted of market manipulation 
under s 1041A and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.82 In early 2009 Mr Musumeci was convicted 
of market manipulation in the Victorian County Court and sentenced to seven months imprisonment, 
fully suspended on account of his cooperation with ASIC’s investigation.83 Before this conviction in 
early 2008 an ASIC delegate had banned Mr Musumeci for four years, determining his facilitation of 
the manipulative trading in GTG shares indicated he ‘would not comply with financial services laws in 
the future’ under s 920A(1)(f).  
 
The Tribunal noted that RG 98 did not discuss the interplay between ASIC’s complementary criminal 
and civil enforcement powers;84 that Santow J’s 15 propositions in Adler (2002) had emphasised the 
protective rather than punitive focus of banning orders;85 and that the High Court in Rich v ASIC (2004) 
220 CLR 129 had held the concepts of public protection and personal punishment to not be mutually 
exclusive fields of discourse.86 Noting that the sentencing judge was satisfied of the unlikelihood of Mr 
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82 ASIC Media Release 14-320MR ‘Former Genetic Technologies CEO jailed for market manipulation’ (28 
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83 ASIC Media Release AD09-19 ‘Brokers sentenced over market manipulation’ (16 February 2009); Musumeci 
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Musumeci re-offending, the Tribunal concluded that neither personal nor general deterrence warranted 
ASIC’s four year ban.87 SM Taylor therefore varied the ban to two years on account of Mr Musumeci's 
criminal conviction and suspended sentence, which had not yet been imposed when the ASIC delegate 
made the original four year ban.88   
 
Similar reasoning was applied in Fraser and ASIC [2011] AATA 944; (2011) 125 ALD 121. As a 
former Authorised Representative of Bridges Personal Investment Services (Bridges), Mr Fraser had 
prepared financial plans for customers of Heritage Building Society (Heritage). Under an arrangement 
with Bridges, he was entitled to retain approximately 70 per cent of the fees paid by Heritage customers 
and was required to remit the remaining 30 per cent to Heritage and Bridges. However, on at least 37 
occasions he failed to account to Heritage and Bridges for these amounts, thereby receiving a total of 
$3,487.50 to which he was not entitled. Over a year after leaving Bridges, he was convicted in the 
Queensland Magistrates Court on 37 charges of misappropriating money owed to his employer (to 
which he pleaded guilty) and was fined $2,500 without a conviction being recorded. He also paid the 
$3,487.50 in restitution. Following a further investigation, ASIC permanently banned Mr Fraser after 
determining that he was not of good fame and character.89 However in noting the amounts Mr Fraser 
received to be modest; that he had been new to the industry at the time of his misconduct; that Bridges 
had initially appeared to be unconcerned with following up the $3,487.50; and that he had an otherwise 
unblemished record before and following his misconduct, the Tribunal found no reason to conclude he 
was not of good fame and character.90 Noting his cooperation with the authorities, his guilty plea, and 
his otherwise unblemished record, the Tribunal varied his permanent ban to six months.91  
 
Whilst these two banning orders were varied, as Part IVB discusses, in other cases the Tribunals have 
taken a much stricter approach in affirming bans imposed by ASIC for fraudulent and/or dishonest 
conduct involving client monies.    
 
C. Breaches of financial advice standards 
Breaches of the Act’s requirements governing the provision of financial advice provided the grounds 
for ASIC to impose the seven banning orders discussed below. These breaches included failures to 
comply with the ‘appropriate advice’ requirement under the (pre-2012) s 945A, which was replaced by 
the obligations for advisers to act in the ‘best interests’ of their clients under s 961B in 2012; and failures 
to provide clients with Statements of Advice (SOAs) to the standard and/or within the timeframes 
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required by s 947C.92  In the cases discussed below, the reasons for the Tribunals varying the original 
bans included the findings of little or no adverse effect from the breaches; the contrition of the 
applicants; and the assessment of the risk of future breaches being low or non-existent.  
 
In Hayes and ASIC [2006] AATA 1506; (2006) 93 ALD 494, the Tribunal varied ASIC’s three year 
ban of a para-planner to one year. ASIC’s investigation found that when advising clients about changes 
to their superannuation arrangements, Mr Hayes had breached ss 946D and 947D by failing to provide 
SOAs within the required five days (instead taking up to two months), and that he had breached the 
former s 945A through not adequately investigating their financial objectives.93 The Tribunal accepted 
ASIC’s expert evidence that Mr Hayes’ financial advice fell short of industry standards.94 After 
rejecting Mr Hayes’ proposed enforceable undertaking95 and noting that many affected clients were his 
friends and relatives, Deputy President Purvis attributed Mr Hayes’ breaches to his ‘misguided 
enthusiasm to assist [his] clients and develop a client base of his own’. Whilst concluding a ban was 
warranted, Purvis DP considered the three year ban against Mr Hayes, who was at the early stage of his 
career, as excessive.96  
 
In two cases ASIC banned financial advisors who had recommended their clients to invest in the 
Westpoint Group, which collapsed in 2006 owing around $388 million to investors.97 In both cases 
ASIC found the financial advisors had breached the former s 945A through inadequately investigating 
their clients’ objectives, and their failure to make their own inquiries about the Westpoint investments.  
 
The first of these Westpoint banning cases was Eikelboom and ASIC [2009] AATA 474. Nine of Mr 
Eikelboom’s clients had sustained major losses from their investments in Westpoint, with two clients 
losing all of the $150,000 they invested following his recommendations. Concurring with ASIC’s 
                                                             
92 For an overview of these provisions, and ASIC’s expectations about the standards that financial advice should 
meet to comply with these requirements, see ASIC Regulatory Guide 175 ‘Licensing: Financial product advisers 
- Conduct and Disclosure’ (ASIC, March 2017) 
93 Hayes and ASIC [2006] AATA 1506 at [16] – [31] 
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switched ...’: Hayes and ASIC [2006] AATA 1506 at [37] – [38] 
95 Hayes and ASIC [2006] AATA 1506 at [48] – [50] – although no specific details of the content of Mr Hayes’ 
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96 Hayes and ASIC [2006] AATA 1506 at [65] – [66]. A similar assessment of the limited number of affected 
clients was evident in Lelliot and ASIC [2009] AATA 110 (involving the promotion of a company that was 
promoting horse racing and gaming in Lithuania) 




finding that Mr Eikelboom’s advice to his clients fell short of the standards expected of financial 
advisors, Nicholson DP determined that through being new to his role of being an Authorised 
Representative, Mr Eikelboom had paid inadequate attention to ascertaining his clients’ financial 
objectives and the risk profiles of the Westpoint investments.98 He therefore determined that s 
920A(1)(e) justified Mr Eikelboom’s banning.99 After reviewing RG 98, and noting Mr Eikelboom had 
not enriched himself through advising his clients to invest in Westpoint, the Tribunal attributed his 
clients’ losses to his carelessness rather than his dishonesty. After noting his cooperation with ASIC’s 
investigation, his lack of any prior contraventions and his voluntary ceasing of working in the financial 
services industry, the Tribunal varied his three year ban to two years.100 
 
Secondly, in Kofkin and ASIC [2009] AATA 660, Deputy President McDonald varied ASIC’s ten year 
ban of a financial planner whose approximately 80 clients had suffered major losses from the collapse 
of Westpoint to three years. McDonald DP regarded with concern that rather than requesting written 
information about the Westpoint investment products, Mr Kofkin had relied upon verbal assurances 
from the Westpoint promoters.101 He concluded that Mr Kofkin, and others in his firm Glenhurst 
Corporation, had failed to properly scrutinise Westpoint’s investment products for inclusion on 
Glenhurst’s Approved Products List for promotion to the firm’s clients,102 and that the clients’ losses 
were attributable to these omissions.103 The Tribunal weighed up Mr Kofkin’s proposed enforceable 
undertaking (involving him being supervised and mentored, and no longer recommending mezzanine 
finance products similar to those issued by Westpoint),104 with the factors in favour of a banning order 
– particularly the significant losses by his clients and the numerous failings in his duties under the 
former s 945A of the Act.105 He also noted several clients had remained with Mr Kofkin despite their 
Westpoint losses; that several character references had shown his otherwise unblemished record and 
good reputation; that he had taken steps to improve the financial advisory processes at Glenhurst 
following the collapse of Westpoint; and that he ‘was not the only advisor to be caught by the irregular 
undertakings given by the promoters of the Westpoint products’.106 After considering the RG 98 
guidelines,107 and acknowledging the financial impact of the ban on Mr Kofkin, and his recognition of 
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his errors, the Tribunal determined the ban should not be so long to ‘irrevocably destroy his career’, 
and varied the ban to three years.108   
 
A major crisis confronted ASIC in late 2009 following the collapse of Trio Capital. Having fraudulently 
misappropriated around $176 million in Australian superannuation funds, the collapse of Trio Capital 
prompted a Parliamentary Joint Committee inquiry, which characterised Trio as ‘the largest 
superannuation fraud in Australia’s history’.109 ASIC took enforcement action against a range of persons 
and entities that were involved in the operation of, and promotion of investment in entities controlled 
by Trio Capital.110 This included issuing a three year ban to financial advisors Mr Peter and Mrs Anne-
Marie Seagrim, who had transferred 972 clients (with funds totalling $210 million) to funds managed 
by Trio-controlled Astarra Capital Ltd in an effort to protect their clients’ financial investments from 
market volatility during the Global Financial Crisis. ASIC’s delegate identified six areas of concern in 
the Seagrims’ advice to their clients, and determined these breaches to warrant a three year ban.111   
 
However in Seagrim and ASIC [2012] AATA 583, the Seagrims successfully challenged the merits of 
ASIC’s three year ban, with Deputy President Jarvis differing in his view the seriousness of the 
Seagrims breaches. He first determined that the Seagrims’ breach of the base level financial 
requirements of its AFS Licence (which required Seagrims to maintain a specified surplus of assets 
over liabilities) was attributable to the unexpected loss of the client base of another financial services 
business which Seagrims had acquired in 2007, and noted no clients had been prejudiced by this 
breach.112 Secondly, he regarded the Seagrims’ failure to disclose commissions and other benefits 
received from Astarra in its Financial Services Guides ‘as a technical matter’, given that the SOAs 
provided to clients disclosed these details.113 In relation to ASIC’s third concern that Seagrims had 
breached his duties under the former s 945A of the Act through failing to adequately determine their 
clients’ personal circumstances before advising them to migrate their investments into Astarra funds, 
he noted that many of these individuals were long-standing clients; that the Seagrims were unaware of 
the fraudulent operation of the Astarra funds at the time; and that they did not gain financially through 
these alleged breaches.114  
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In concluding the Seagrims to have learnt from their experiences, Jarvis DP disagreed with ASIC’s 
contention that they would not comply with financial services laws in the future, and hence found the s 
920A(1)(f) banning ground was not established.115 Taking account of the considerations outlined in 
Adler (2002) and RG 98, he determined their breaches were not intentional; the benefits they had 
received were inconsequential, and that the seriousness of the breaches was grossly disproportionate to 
the costs they had incurred in assisting their clients.116, Jarvis DP therefore varied ASIC’s ban to six 
months.117 
 
The first Tribunal decision to apply the s 961A (which was introduced by the 2012 FOFA reforms) was 
Prasad and ASIC [2016] AATA 384. ASIC’s review of financial advisor Mr Prasad found he had failed 
to have a reasonable basis for his advice to four clients in relation to their superannuation and Total and 
Permanent Disability (TPD) insurance arrangements during late 2013. ASIC had found Mr Prasad’s 
SOAs breached s 947C through inadequately detailing his conversations with clients and not outlining 
their financial circumstances, and failing to detail the comparative features, and suitability of the 
financial products he recommended to clients. Other SOAs omitted information about fees and charges, 
and one SOAs failed to warn that the client would lose an income protection entitlement under another 
fund policy and that the client’s amount of TPD cover would be reduced by $300,000.118 ASIC had also 
found Mr Prasad’s files were poorly maintained – with many documents unsigned, undated and left 
blank, and considerable inter-mingling between financial services and mortgage broking files,119 
prompting the imposition of a three year ban. 
 
Whilst Mr Prasad identified previous Tribunal decisions on s 920A bans where prohibitions of less than 
three years were imposed for what he characterised as ‘demonstrably more egregious conduct’,120 
Deutsch DP rejected such arguments, noting that all Tribunal decisions depended heavily on the 
circumstances of each case.121 Whilst agreeing that Mr Prasad’s ‘could not be bothered’ attitude to the 
preparation and completion of SOAs breached s 947C, Deutsch DP considered that s 961B(1), which 
provides a safe harbour for financial advisors who can demonstrate their adherence to the measures 
outlined in s 962B(2), was ‘… not the only way in which acting in the best interests of the client can be 
demonstrated’;122 although he did not elaborate further on this reasoning. After determining that Mr 
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Prasad’s conduct involved carelessness (rather than dishonesty or deliberate deception); that he made 
no personal gain from his breaches of s 947C; and that his clients suffered no financial detriment from 
his breaches, the Tribunal considered his misconduct to warrant a shorter ban of 18 months.123   
 
More recently in Downey and ASIC [2017] AATA 958 the former director of a financial services 
business was approached by a migration lawyer whose client was applying for a Significant Investor 
Visa. Such visas required applicants to make a minimum investment of $5 million into a registered 
managed investment scheme which was a ‘complying investment’ under the Migration Regulations 
1994 (Cth).124 In response to the lawyer’s request to establish a complying investment scheme for the 
client, Mr Downey advised that the scheme could not accept funds until it was registered with ASIC. 
However before the scheme was registered with ASIC (and without the prior knowledge of Mr Downey 
or the lawyer), the client deposited $3 million into the scheme. Around two weeks later, Mr Downey 
returned the $3 million to the client.125 However, two days after the client had deposited the $3 million 
into the fund, Mr Downey emailed the lawyer two signed letters certifying that the client had made 
‘complying investment’ (which had not yet occurred), which the lawyer then forwarded (via the client’s 
migration agent) to an officer within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade who was assessing 
the client’s visa application.126  
 
In imposing a six year ban ASIC’s delegate determined that by sending these signed letters certifying 
that a complying investment had been made, Mr Downey had breached 1041H.127 At the Tribunal Mr 
Downey maintained the signed letters were only drafts which he had not intended to be forwarded to 
the relevant government authorities. In rejecting this contention Kendall DP agreed with ASIC that Mr 
Downey’s conduct breached s 1041H and thus warranted a banning order.128 However he considered a 
four year ban to be more appropriate after characterising Mr Downey’s actions as ‘extraordinarily 
reckless, bordering on incompetent’ rather than being malicious and intentionally deceptive.129 
 
D. Unlicensed provision of financial advice  
In a number of  cases the AAT varied banning orders against individuals who had provided financial 
advice without holding AFS Licences or being Authorised Representatives of such licensees (in breach 
of s 911A), after assessing the need for future public protection from such activities as minimal. Firstly 
in Nolan and ASIC [2006] AATA 778 a financial advisor had operated a discretionary portfolio 
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management business through his company Global Portfolios Pty Ltd between 1993 and 2002 without 
holding a Securities Dealers Licence under the former Corporations Law. Mr Nolan had been refused 
a Securities Dealers Licence in 1997, but in 2002 ASIC granted Global Portfolios a Restricted General 
Advice Licence. Mr Nolan acted as a representative of Global Portfolios without holding a proper 
authority, causing Global Portfolios to breach its Securities Dealers Licence in 2002. Mr Nolan had also 
breached an undertaking he gave to ASIC in December 1998 to not advise or deal in securities during 
1999. ASIC’s delegate also found Mr Nolan had breached his duties to his clients through short selling 
units in a managed fund, and by using clients’ funds to cover potential losses on these transactions; and 
in failing to maintain clients’ funds in trust accounts separate from those of Global Portfolios.130 After 
somewhat curiously criticising ASIC’s decision to grant what he descried as an ‘inappropriate’ 
Securities Dealers’ Licence to Global Portfolios,131 Olney DP accepted ASIC’s concerns that Mr Nolan 
would not comply with financial services laws, thereby engaging s 920A(1)(f).132 However after noting 
Mr Nolan’s character references and his intentions of only working in the financial services industry as 
an employee (and not as an Authorised Representative), he characterised ASIC’s five year ban as 
‘excessive’ and varied it to a three year ban - albeit without referring to RG 98 or other authorities.133 
 
The more recent case of Amargianitakis and ASIC [2015] AATA 720 involved an unlicensed dealing 
in financial products by an accountant. One of Mr Amargianitakis’ companies (Vista Capital Pty Ltd) 
had raised money from clients of his accountancy business (Akis & Associates) to invest in property, 
mezzanine finance and mortgage lending schemes, with the clients becoming lenders to these projects. 
In 2011 both Vista and Akis collapsed in insolvency.134 The Tribunal noted with concern that Vista had 
raised around $36 million from financially unsophisticated retail clients of Akis,135 in respect of whom 
Mr Amargianitakis did not ascertain their financial objectives or the appropriateness of these loans, nor 
direct them to obtain independent legal advice. Deputy President Deutsch also rejected Mr 
Amargianitakis’ contention that he had merely offered his clients an investment opportunity;136 and his 
denial that the clients had depended on his advice.137 Deutsch DP considered that with his 25 years in 
the finance industry Mr Amargianitakis ought to have appreciated that by facilitating this financing, 
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Vista providing financial services without being licensed or authorised.138 He also found Mr 
Amargianitakis had breached s 1041H through his misrepresentations of the loan arrangements and the 
former s 945A by failing to consider his clients’ financial circumstances.139 In light of the Adler (2002) 
propositions, Deutsch DP found these factors to warrant a longer ban.140 However he also found factors 
in favour of a shorter ban including the lack of dishonesty on Mr Amargianitakis’ part; his expressions 
of contrition (and that he had taken steps to improve understanding of financial services regulations.141 
After rejecting a proposed enforceable undertaking, which Deutsch DP considered to lack specificity142 
he varied ASIC’s eight year ban to six years.143  
 
IV. Section 920A bans that have been affirmed   
 
A. Importance of protecting consumers from serious and/or repeated breaches  
In a number of cases the Tribunals affirmed s 920A banning orders imposed for serious and/or repeated 
breaches of financial services laws, in order to protect consumers from the risk of such misconduct 
recurring in the future.144  
 
In Parker and ASIC [2016] AATA 983 Senior Member Walsh affirmed ASIC’s permanent ban under s 
920A (and also under s 80 of the NCCP Act) of a former automotive finance broker. ASIC’s 
investigation had found Mr Parker had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 
1041H of the Act, s 12DA of the ASIC Act, and s 33 of the NCCP Act through misleading four clients 
with poor credit histories into believing that their motor vehicle finance applications would be approved, 
and through also preparing loan applications without the knowledge or consent of guarantors named in 
the applications.145 SM Walsh also noted with concern that for around half of the motor vehicle loans 
he brokered, Mr Parker arranged unsolicited insurance (for which he gained commissions), which 
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inflated the amounts that clients were obliged to pay for their loans.146 After finding all of the breaches 
alleged by ASIC to be substantiated,147 the Tribunal rejected Mr Parker’s expressions of remorse for his 
conduct; his claim that he was only 24 years old at the time of his misconduct and had been ‘naïve and 
stupid’; and that he had been ‘brainwashed’ into going along the practices of other brokers in his 
company.148 After considering the guidelines in RG 98, the Tribunal concluded his serious and dishonest 
misconduct to be premeditated and repeated, which had the potential to undermine public confidence 
in the credit and financial services industries.149  
 
Panganiban and ASIC [2017] AATA 1026 arose from ASIC’s permanent banning of a financial adviser 
who had made unnecessary changes to the insurance arrangements of 49 of his clients.150 Between 2011 
and 2014 as an authorised representative of AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd, Mr Panganiban advised 
the 49 clients who held risk insurance through their AMP superannuation fund to cancel their existing 
AMP insurance policies and replace these with new AMP insurance policies. By ceasing and replacing 
the insurance policies, rather than simply transferring them, the full rate of commission became payable 
to AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd, with Mr Panganiban's remuneration being positively influenced by 
the upfront commissions generated as a result of this advice. Of concern to ASIC was that Mr 
Panganiban’s actions in replacing the insurance policies exposed the clients to avoidable risks including 
gaps in cover and changes in policy terms, the possibility of extra policy loadings and exclusions, and 
that it also unnecessarily restarted the non-disclosure period that allows insurers to avoid policies within 
the first three years of inception for inadvertent non-disclosure.151 The Tribunal concurred with ASIC’s 
assessment of the seriousness of Mr Panganiban’s deliberate and repeated misconduct,152 and noted that 
rather than acting in the best interests of his clients, he had been motivated by his own financial self-
interest.153 Senior Member Taylor concluded that Mr Panganiban’s lack of insight into the nature and 
extent of his misconduct demonstrated that he was ‘not of good fame or character’, which justified 
ASIC’s permanent banning under s 920A(1)(d).154 
 
In McCormack and ASIC [2016] AATA 1021, the Tribunal initially set aside the five year banning of a 
former financial planner. In a highly complex and unusual set of circumstances, after becoming 
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concerned that one of his new clients appeared to have been defrauded through a superannuation 
transfer, Mr McCormack had impersonated the new client, and then assisted the new client to forge the 
signature of another person, in order to recover the funds that he (incorrectly) assumed had been 
stolen.155 Whist SM Fice accepted ASIC’s view that these ‘deceptive and foolhardy’ actions breached 
s 1041H,156 he accepted Mr McCormack’s explanation that his sole concern was to protect the interests 
of his new client.157 He also accepted Mr McCormack’s submission that his actions had been out of 
character in his otherwise complaint-free career; that he had not been motivated by financial gain; and 
that he had taken immediate steps to return the moneys to the affected account holder after becoming 
aware of his gross error.158 He concluded that with the adverse publicity following ASIC’s ban (which 
he considered would deter others from similar misconduct), Mr McCormack would not undertake 
similar actions in the future; and that rather than protecting the public, the ban would effectively penalise 
Mr McCormack for his poor judgment.159 However ASIC successfully appealed the Tribunal’s 
determination in the FCA. O’Callaghan J held that the Tribunal had erred in concluding the  a ban was 
unwarranted given that no actual financial loss had occurred through Mr McCormack’s misconduct; 160 
that ASIC had not alleged dishonesty by Mr McCormack;161 and that the Tribunal had failed to give 
adequate weight to the importance of general deterrence.162 Although the matter was remitted to the 
AAT for re-hearing, Mr McCormack subsequently withdrew his application.163 
  
More recently in O’Sullivan and ASIC [2017] AATA 644, the Tribunal affirmed ASIC’s seven year 
banning of the former Managing Director of Provident Capital Ltd, a property finance company which 
collapsed in October 2012. Provident had issued debentures to retail investors through a Fixed Term 
Investment Portfolio and advanced these funds to third party borrowers including property developers. 
At the time of its collapse, Provident owed around $201 million to its debenture holders.164  In a lengthy 
decision, the Tribunal found that the former Managing Director had been involved in causing Provident 
to make misleading and deceptive statements in its debenture prospectus to investors about the status 
of Provident’s loan for its major Queensland property development, in contravention of ss 728 and 
1041H.165 In concluding Mr O’Sullivan’s conduct had involved ‘the repeated camouflaging and 
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concealment of critical information from investors’, Deputy President Deutsch affirmed the seven year 
ban under s 920A(1)(e).166  
 
In two later decisions the Tribunal affirmed ASIC’s banning of former non-executive directors of 
Provident Messrs Sweeney and Seymour, holding that they had been knowingly involved in Provident’s 
contraventions of s 1041H through their acquiescence in approving misleading statements in its 
prospectus. In Mr Sweeney’s case the Tribunal affirmed his two year ban and rejected his proposed 
enforceable undertaking to not seek future roles as an Authorised Representative.167 In the case of Mr 
Seymour (who had also served as a Responsible Officer of Provident for its AFS licence) Senior 
Member Taylor affirmed his three year ban.168   
 
B. Protecting consumers from persons convicted of fraud 
Whilst s 920A(1)(c) enables ASIC to make a banning order when a person is ‘convicted of fraud’, the 
Act does not define ‘fraud’. Nevertheless in several cases the Tribunals affirmed ASIC’s permanent 
banning orders against individuals who had been convicted of offences involving fraud, emphasising 
the importance of protecting the investing public from the future risk of such misconduct.  
 
For instance, in Howarth and ASIC (2008) 101 ALD 602; (2008) 48 AAR 1, [2008] AATA 278 an 
insurance broker had arranged fictitious insurance premium funding loans totalling around $1.4 million. 
In collusion several clients, Mr Howarth then mis-directed the funds obtained towards repayment of 
personal debts and the purchase of race horses.169 His firm received approximately $86,593 in 
commissions for arranging these fictitious loans.170 In the Victorian County Court Mr Howarth pleaded 
guilty to four counts of obtaining financial advantage by deception under s 82 of the Crimes Act 1958 
(Vic). In imposing a suspended sentence, and noting that all loans had been fully repaid, the County 
Court judge was satisfied that Mr Howarth was unlikely to re-offend.171  
 
However different considerations applied at the Tribunal hearing. Whilst noting no clients had lost 
money through his misconduct Deputy President Forgie was concerned by Mr Howarth’s concession 
during that if his practices had not been discovered, he would have continued his fraudulent arranging 
of such loans.172 Given the elements of dishonesty in the offences for which he was convicted, Forgie 
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DP agreed that s 920A(1)(c) justified Mr Howarth’s banning.173 She concluded ASIC’s permanent ban 
was justified given Mr Howarth’s deliberate making of false statements when arranging the loans;174 
his claims that the financiers’ forms and practices enabled him to take advantage of them;175 and his 
dismissal of the seriousness of his misconduct by emphasising all loans had been repaid.176 Forgie DP 
rejected Mr Howarth’s proposed enforceable undertaking for twice-yearly audits of his business and his 
compliance with financial services laws, which she considered would not adequately protect the public, 
nor uphold public confidence in the ethical operation of the financial services industry.177   
 
In two cases involving finance brokers the Tribunals affirmed permanent bans imposed under s 
920A(1)(c) as well as the parallel bans imposed under s 80(1)(c) of the NCCP Act. Firstly in Sahay and 
ASIC [2016] AATA 583 a finance broker had been convicted by the NSW Local Court on three counts 
of making false statements and using false documents for home loan applications, and was sentenced 
to 350 hours of community service. The total amounts of these home loans was over $7 million, with 
Mr Sahay’s company receiving over $5,000 in commissions for arranging these.178 Constance DP 
reasoned that whilst the sentencing magistrate had assessed Mr Sahay’s misconduct at the lower end of 
the scale of criminal seriousness, the different considerations of protecting the public and deterring 
others from such conduct applied to the Tribunal’s considerations.179 He noted Mr Sahay’s misconduct 
had been deliberate and repeated, continuing until his fraud was discovered by authorities; that it had 
breached the trust placed in him both by his clients and by lenders; and that as an experienced operator 
in the credit industry, he ought to have known better.180  
 
Secondly in JSKN and ASIC [2017] AATA 818 a mortgage broker had been convicted on eight counts 
of contravening s 160D(2) of the NCCP Act through her actions in falsifying letters about the 
employment status of several of her self-employed clients. She submitted these falsified letters to 
Westpac to support mortgage applications by her clients totalling over $1.6 million - from which she 
received over $6,000 in commissions.181 Senior Member Tavoularis held that whilst the Magistrate had 
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imposed a fine of $8,500, the actual penalty imposed was of no relevance to the definition of ‘serious 
fraud’ under s 5 of the NCCP Act and s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (which both define ‘serious 
fraud’ to mean offences involving fraud or dishonesty which are punishable for a period of at least three 
months). Rather he clarified that it need only be demonstrated that each of the offences for which the 
mortgage broker had been convicted carried a possible penalty of imprisonment for a period in excess 
of three months.182 In finding her misconduct involved several of the factors listed in Table 2 of RG 98 
(and Table 2 of RG 218) justifying lengthy bans, the Tribunal affirmed ASIC’s permanent bans.  
 
C. Protecting consumers from serious and/or repeated breaches of financial advice standards 
In contrast to the cases involving breaches of financial advice standards reviewed in Part III, in the cases 
discussed below the Tribunals concurred with ASIC’s determinations about the seriousness and effect 
of the financial advice breaches. Themes in these decisions include the seriousness and repeated nature 
of the breaches over lengthy periods; the failure to disclose potential conflicts of interest; losses by 
affected clients; the lack of contrition by the applicants; the disdain for compliance with financial advice 
laws; the importance of general deterrence and the upholding of professional standards.   
 
A number of serious breaches of financial advice standards were considered in Fuoco and ASIC (2010) 
117 ALD 659; [2010] AATA 739 where Deputy President McDonald affirmed ASIC’s five year 
banning of an authorised representative of the financial advisory firm Elite Equities. Mr Fuoco had 
advised his clients to invest in the Dollarforce Fixed Interest Program (for which he had previously been 
a commission-based salesperson183) and the Ivory Property Trust – unregistered property investment 
schemes that were wound up by ASIC in 2009 after improperly raising over $45 million from the 
public.184 ASIC found Mr Fuoco had failed to properly investigate his clients’ financial circumstances; 
and the suitability of the products he recommended (several of which were not on his firm’s 
Recommended Products List); failed to provide accurate or timely SOAs; that he had breached s 
947C(2)(e) in failing to properly disclose the commission payments he would receive for promoting the 
Dollarforce investments; and that he had pressured several clients to invest.185 McDonald DP found all 
these breaches to be substantiated, and found Mr Fuoco’s provision of financial advice to fall well short 
of the former s 945A requirements.  
 
Whilst noting Mr Fuoco had established his own successful financial advisory business since leaving 
Dollarforce which employed several staff, his references from satisfied clients, and that he had a 
dependent infant daughter, the Tribunal considered these factors did not outweigh his responsibilities 
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as an Authorised Representative when advising retail clients. McDonald DP also rejected Mr Fuoco’s 
claims of being pressured to sell to his former clients; and also his attempts to attribute his breaches to 
his former employer’s failure to supervise him or have adequate compliance arrangements in place.186 
Whilst assessing the likelihood of future breaches by Mr Fuoco to be low, the Tribunal nevertheless 
emphasised the importance of general deterrence as a significant factor in the imposition of a banning 
order.187 McDonald DP rejected Mr Fuoco’s proposed enforceable undertaking for regular audits of his 
business over a two year period as not adequately protecting the investing public.188 In affirming ASIC’s 
five year ban, Deputy President McDonald dismissed ASIC’s argument for a higher ban of ten years, 
considering such an increase would be excessive and amount to a punishment of Mr Fuoco.189  
 
Numerous breaches of financial services laws were considered by the Tribunal in Nguyen and ASIC 
[2012] AATA 156, where Senior Member Ettinger affirmed ASIC’s seven year banning of Mr Don 
Nguyen, a former financial advisor with Commonwealth Financial Planning (CFP) within the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) between 1999 and 2009. It has been widely acknowledged 
that media and public reaction to Mr Nguyen’s misconduct, which caused significant losses to his 
clients, was a major factor in prompting the 2014 Senate inquiry into the performance of ASIC.190 SM 
Ettinger concurred with ASIC’s finding that Mr Nguyen had failed to have a reasonable basis for his 
advice, or to warn that his advice was based on incomplete information (in breach of the former ss 945A 
and 945B); that he failed to provide SOAs and Product Disclosure Statements; and that through making 
false or misleading statements (including the expected returns of investments, and convincing risk-
averse clients to invest using margin loans), he breached ss 1041E, 1041F and 1041H.191  
 
The Tribunal noted with concern Mr Nguyen’s attribution of his predicament to the Global Financial 
Crisis and the lack of training and supervision he received from CFP, and his denial that he had breached 
financial services laws.192 Mindful of the importance of specific and general deterrence and of 
upholding public confidence in the financial advisory profession, the Tribunal determined Mr Nguyen’s 
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conduct reflected the RG 98 criteria justifying a banning in the range of three to ten years. This included 
his false and misleading conduct being inconsistent with the orderly operation of a financial market 
(thus undermining public confidence); the significant losses of his clients; his past and current disregard 
for compliance with the law (including the failure to maintain appropriate records); his failure to have 
a reasonable basis for his advice to clients; and his failure to disclose his receipt of commissions and 
other benefits, and relevant interests and associations.193 In addition to finding s 920A(1)(e) to be 
enlivened through these numerous breaches, SM Ettinger also found Mr Nguyen’s pattern of conduct 
justified a ban under s 920A(1)(f) – holding that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to be satisfied 
that Mr Nguyen would breach a financial services law in the future.194   
 
As noted previously in Part III, the collapse of Trio Capital in 2009 resulted in the loss of over $176 
million from Australian superannuation funds, with ASIC taking enforcement action against a range of 
advisors who promoted investment into funds controlled by Trio Capital.195 In the two cases below the 
Tribunal affirmed two s 920A bans made against financial advisors whose clients had sustained major 
losses through their investments in Trio-controlled funds.   
 
First, in Caines and ASIC [2012] AATA 289, the Tribunal affirmed the five year banning order against 
a financial advisor, after an earlier tribunal hearing in 2011 had varied the ban to three years.196 ASIC 
had found that Mr Caines had advised eight of his clients to invest amounts totalling around $1 million 
in Trio-controlled Astarra Capital, without disclosing to his clients that he (together with his wife and 
one of his companies) had received loans totalling over $500,000 from a director of Astarra Capital, 
thus breaching s 947C. The ASIC delegate also noted Mr Caines had become bankrupt after the failure 
of a property development, thereby also enlivening s 920A(1)(bb) as a basis for a banning order. Whilst 
imposing a permanent ban due to his bankruptcy, the delegate informed Mr Caines of his right to apply 
under s 920D to vary the ban upon his discharge from bankruptcy. However when Mr Caines applied 
for a variation to his permanent ban in 2010 upon his discharge from bankruptcy, the delegate 
determined a five year ban to be appropriate.197   
 
At the 2011 Tribunal hearing, Mr Caines submitted that given his otherwise unblemished record, the 
five year ban had adversely impacted upon his professional prospects at his age of 58 and his ability to 
support his two dependent children. He also claimed to have originally considered the $500,000 loan 
from the director of Astarra Capital to be a personal loan which did not influence his advice to clients; 
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but conceded during the 2011 Tribunal hearing that in hindsight it ought to have been disclosed. After 
referring to RG 98 and noting his lack of previous contraventions; that the ASIC delegate did not find 
any dishonesty or intention to defraud; and Mr Caines’ evidence of acquainting himself with relevant 
legislation and ASIC regulatory guidance,198 Deputy President Handley varied ASIC’s ban to three 
years, and also accepted an enforceable undertaking requiring Mr Caines to complete an ASIC-
approved professional education course and be subject to closer supervision by any new employers.199  
 
However these orders were set aside by the FCA, which remitted the matter back to the AAT for re-
hearing.200 At the 2012 Tribunal hearing, Senior Member Letcher found no significant changes to 
warrant a variation of ASIC’s five year ban..201   
 
Secondly, in Tarrant and ASIC [2013] AATA 926; (2013) 62 AAR 192, ASIC had imposed a seven 
year ban against a financial advisor who had invested more than $23 million on behalf of his clients in 
the Trio-controlled Astarra Strategic Fund (ASF). ASIC had found that Mr Tarrant’s promotion of 
investment in the ASF to his clients, involved numerous serious breaches. These included his failure to 
have a reasonable basis for his advice to eight clients who lacked financial literacy and had a 
conservative financial risk profile, but whom he convinced to take out significant margin loans and to 
set up Self-Managed Superannuation Funds to invest in the ASF (in breach of the former s 945A); his 
failure to disclose that he would receive a marketing allowance (totalling over $1 million) for investing 
clients’ monies in the ASF (in breach of ss 947B and 947C); and making false or misleading statements 
to clients about the remuneration and benefits he would receive (in breach of ss 1041E and 1041H).202 
The Tribunal found these breaches to have been established in over 40 instances,203 and also noted with 
concern evidence from a former employee that Mr Tarrant had instructed his client advisors to ‘Stress 
the need to educate the client and make them understand the concept of margin lending and how it can 
help build their strategy’, and that he had also emphasised to his staff that clients could be changed from 
an ‘assertive’ to an ‘aggressive’ risk profile as they became ‘more educated’.204  
 
In dismissing Mr Tarrant’s arguments that the failings of regulators, auditors and other market 
participants to identify and intervene in the fraudulent operation of the ASF negated his obligations 
under the former s 945A of the Act, the Tribunal reasoned that whilst he was not on notice of the Trio 
Capital fraud, the high risk nature of the ASF ought to have been apparent to a prudent financial 
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advisor.205 The Tribunal determined that 12 of the 15 factors identified by Santow J in Adler (2002) 
applied in Mr Tarrant’s case – noting that whilst not deliberately dishonest, he had been both 
incompetent and negligent. In concluding these breaches to have been serious, repeated and causing 
large losses to the retirement savings of investors, and Mr Tarrant had shown no contrition for his 
misconduct, the Tribunal concluded ASIC’s seven year ban was warranted to protect the public from 
such misconduct.206  
 
The Full Federal Court considered but dismissed Mr Tarrant’s appeal against the Tribunal’s 
determination. Rares, Yates and Griffiths JJ held that Mr Tarrant had not identified any legal errors in 
the Tribunal’s reasoning – in particular noting that the Tribunal had been justified in applying Santow 
J’s 15 propositions from Adler (2002)207 relating to the determination of the length and banning and 
disqualification orders;208 and that in its inquisitorial function, the Tribunal had been justified in asking 
its own questions of the various witnesses that gave evidence at the various hearings.209 
 
D. Deterring insider trading  
Three AAT cases affirmed s 920A banning orders imposed for insider trading. In two related cases, the 
Tribunals considered banning orders imposed against stockbrokers whom ASIC alleged to have been 
involved in insider trading, pending the criminal prosecution of the individuals. Both cases concerned 
trading in listed healthcare company Vision Systems Ltd (VSL), before VSL entered into a 
confidentiality agreement with US-based Ventana Medical Systems Inc to undertake due diligence with 
a view to a making a takeover offer.  
 
In the first case, McKenzie and ASIC [2009] AATA 1003, Deputy President McDonald affirmed the 
three year banning of stockbroker Mr Mark McKenzie,210 whom ASIC alleged to have procured others 
to acquire VSL securities based on inside information he obtained from colleagues and other contacts 
in the stockbroking industry, in contravention of s 1043A(1)(d). In noting the Tribunal’s role as standing 
in the place of the ASIC delegate as the original decision-maker to determine the correct or preferable 
decision (where neither party bore the onus of proof), McDonald DP reasoned that it would be 
impracticable to expect an ASIC delegate to call expert evidence (as a court would do) to an 
administrative hearing to determine the imposition of a banning order.211 After accepting ASIC’s 
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evidence that no research or media reports had mentioned the possibility of VSL being a takeover target 
around the time of the relevant trading, McDonald DP dismissed Mr McKenzie’s claim that his 
purchases of VSL shares were prompted by ‘generally circulating feelings in the market’.212 McDonald 
DP held that as an experienced stockbroker, Mr McKenzie ought to have been aware of the prohibition 
against insider trading.213 Whilst noting that Mr McKenzie (aged 39) had a young family to support, 
and  his otherwise unblemished professional record, after considering the RG 98 guidelines he 
concluded the misconduct undermined public confidence in the integrity of financial markets, and that 
the importance of protecting the public, warranted the three year ban.214 Several months after the 
Tribunal hearing, Mr McKenzie was charged with insider trading offences.215 
 
In the second case, YFFM and ASIC [2010] AATA 340, Senior Member Penglis affirmed ASIC’s five 
year banning of a stockbroker whom ASIC alleged to have communicated rumours about Ventana’s 
possible bid before this information was generally available. After considering ASIC’s evidence 
(including transcripts of recorded phone conversations), the Tribunal found the breach of s 1043A to be 
substantiated.216 SM Penglis rejected YFFM’s contention that the elements of the alleged breach of s 
1043A were not sufficiently particularised by ASIC’s evidence, noting that neither ASIC’s delegate nor 
the Tribunal were bound by the laws on the particularisation of evidence for criminal prosecutions.217 
Whilst acknowledging the hardship the ban would cause YFFM,218 in distinguishing his earlier decision 
in Dollas-Ford and ASIC [2006] AATA 704, SM Penglis noted the serious transgressions were not 
‘one-offs’; that YFFM had not shown contrition nor accepted responsibility for his misconduct; and 
that the public interest in market integrity prevailed over YFFM’s personal interests.219 YFFM’s appeal 
to the FCA was dismissed – with Barker J holding that the Tribunal had not improperly imposed an 
onus upon YFFM to establish the existence of market rumours or speculation around the time of his 
trading in VSL shares. This meant he had not established a question of law for the court’s determination 
under s 44(1) of the AAT Act 1975 (Cth).220 
 
More recently, Deputy President Deutsch adopted a similar approach in Batros and ASIC [2017] AATA 
399. ASIC’s delegate had determined that Mr Batros (a private client adviser) had breached s 
1043A(1)(c) through placing orders on behalf of clients to sell shares and options in the listed company 
Metals of Africa Ltd (MTA) whilst he had been in possession of inside information about MTA’s 
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intention to conduct a $5 million capital raising. In finding the s 1043A(1)(c) breaches to be 
substantiated,221 Deutsch DP rejected Mr Batros’ submission that by acting on an “execution only” basis 
and not providing any advice, he was a “mere cypher” for the trading in the MTA shares.222  After also 
concluding that Mr Batros had consciously ignored instructions from senior personnel within his firm 
not to trade in MTA securities, and that he had neither acknowledged his misconduct nor expressed 
contrition, the Tribunal affirmed ASIC’s five year ban.223  
 
E. Deterring market manipulation  
The maintenance of market integrity was a primary concern in Klusman and ASIC [2011] AATA 150, 
(2011) 122 ALD 187, where the Tribunal affirmed ASIC’s three year banning of a stockbroker. In the 
latter part of 2008 Aequs Securities (where Mr Klusman served as Head of Institutional Dealing), had 
been engaged by Regional Express Ltd (Rex) to facilitate its on-market buy-back.224 ASIC’s 
investigation found that during December 2008, Mr Klusman placed bids and asks on the ASX which 
resulted in him buying parcels of Rex shares for his relatives, and then on-selling those parcels of shares 
to Rex at higher prices. ASIC determined this trading to breach 1041A (through creating an artificial 
price) and s 1041B (through creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading) in respect of 
Rex’s securities. Senior Member Ettinger agreed with ASIC’s characterization of these breaches, 
accepting that Mr Klusman had been the dominant trader in the market to set ask and bid prices for Rex, 
which was a thinly-traded stock at the time.225 SM Ettinger also agreed with ASIC’s contention that in 
mid-September 2008, Mr Klusman had breached s 1041H through circulating a rumour to stockbroking 
personnel at his firm that Macquarie Bank was about to announce a rights issue and encouraging those 
present to sell the stock. During the Tribunal hearing Mr Klusman conceded that the information he had 
provided to ASIC during his examination under s 19 of the ASIC Act 2001 about hearing this rumour 
on his car radio that morning had been incorrect – with ASIC’s investigation having found no evidence 
of such news reports.226 During the Global Financial Crisis around this time, ASIC regarded the 
spreading of false market rumours with particular concern given the potential effect of such actions on 
investor confidence and market integrity, and implemented extensive surveillance measures to deter 
such conduct.227 After considering RG 98, the Tribunal acknowledged Mr Klusman’s 32 year otherwise 
unblemished career, his character references and that the ban would cause him hardship. However of 
greater concern was that Mr Klusman’s breaches were multiple and serious, and that he had failed to 
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realise the conflicts in trading on behalf of his relatives. In affirming ASIC’s ban SM Ettinger 
distinguished the earlier Tribunal decision in Lelliott and ASIC [2009] AATA 110 – where Mr Lelliott 
had conceded his misconduct and impressed the Tribunal that he had learned from his mistakes.228 
 
In Bond and ASIC (2009) 108 ALD 187; [2009] AATA 50 Deputy President Hack initially set aside 
ASIC’s five year banning of a financial advisor. In late 2007 Mr Bond placed a sell order for 300,000 
units in the thinly-traded Prime Retirement and Aged Care Property Trust (PTN) on his own behalf at 
$1.00. He then placed a buy order on behalf of several clients for 2.5 million PTN units, gradually 
increasing his offer price for parcels of shares from $0.89 until he acquired a final parcel at $1.01.229 
ASIC determined this trading had created an artificial price for PTN’s securities in breach of s 1041A.230   
 
However Hack DP concluded that as the trades were made at prices reflecting the prevailing forces of 
genuine supply and genuine demand, there was nothing ‘artificial’ about the trading prices merely 
because they exceeded the prices paid by other purchasers before and after the purchases by Mr Bond.231 
Whilst characterising Mr Bond's trading on his own behalf as ‘discreditable’ through not avoiding 
conflicts between his own trading interests and those of his clients, he was not satisfied that Mr Bond 
would ‘not comply’ with a financial services law in the future according to the pre-2012 wording of s 
920A(1)(f). Determining Mr Bond had learnt from his experiences, he set aside ASIC’s ban.232   
 
The Tribunal’s interpretation of s 1041A was overruled in ASIC v AAT; ASIC v Bond (2010) 187 FCR 
334; (2010) 271 ALR 593 [2010] FCA 807, where Dowsett J emphasised that s 1041A did not invite 
considerations of intention – but focused more broadly on market transactions between parties who 
were not genuine buyers and sellers seeking the most favourable price.233 Consequently, His Honour J 
held that the Tribunal erred in concluding that Mr Bond’s sale of his own shares was irrelevant to its 
consideration of the effect or likely effect of the transactions involving PTN shares.234 Dowsett J also 
reasoned that for a banning order to be warranted, it was not necessary for ASIC or the Tribunal be 
satisfied that Mr Bond would in the future, breach a financial services law; but rather that the relevant 
decision-maker needed to have reason to believe that he would do so. The matter was remitted back to 
the Tribunal for further re-determination,235 which affirmed ASIC’s five year banning order.236 
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The definitional parameters of the term ‘financial products’ were tested in Davidof and ASIC [2017] 
AATA 37, where the Tribunal initially set aside ASIC’s three year banning of a former private client 
adviser with Macquarie Bank. The ASIC delegate determined that Mr Davidof had breached ss 1041A 
and 1041B through six transactions involving MINI warrants, which had been traded on the ASX. In 
February and June of 2013, Mr Davidof took part in back-to-back buy and sell trades in MINI warrants 
on the ASX with Mr Phillip McLean, a former senior equities trader Credit Suisse after the pair had 
pre-arranged the price, volume and approximate timing of the trade. On each occasion, in the preceding 
days, Mr McLean had traded SPI Futures on behalf of Mr Davidof resulting in a loss (in February) and 
a profit (in June) for Mr Davidof. ASIC found that the prices at which Messrs Davidof and McLean 
arranged to trade the MINI warrants were designed to transfer the profit/loss from all the preceding 
trading, without reflecting the SPI Futures that were actually traded. ASIC determined this trading was 
likely to have the effect of creating an artificial price for trading in the affected MINI warrants on 
ASX.237 ASIC also imposed a three year ban against Mr McLean.238 
 
In setting aside ASIC’s ban, Senior Member Kelly held that MINI warrants were not ‘derivatives’ 
within the meaning of s 761D(1)(b) (which requires that future consideration provided for a derivative 
transaction arrangement must not be paid before the time period prescribed by the regulations) and reg 
7.1.04 (which prescribes the time period as one business day). Noting that the MINI warrants did not 
have a set expiry date, SM Kelly concluded that as the MINI warrants were not ‘financial products’ 
pursuant to s 765A(1)(c), meaning that Mr Davidof’s trading did not breach ss 1041A or 1041B.239  
 
However ASIC successfully appealed this determination in the FCA.240 In setting aside the Tribunal’s 
decision, Lee J took account of the High Court’s characterisation of the broad and inclusive definitional 
character of Chapter 7 of the Act in International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL 
(Receivers and Managers Appointed).241 Applying this reasoning, His Honour emphasised the 
disjunctive wording of ‘must, or may be required to’ in s 761D(1)(a)242 and that the regulations provided 
for the provision of consideration at a future time which may be less than one business day after the 
arrangement is entered into,243 to conclude that the MINI warrants were ‘derivatives’ within the 
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meaning of s 761D, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for re-determination. In two related 
decisions delivered on the same day, the Tribunal affirmed the bans imposed on Messrs Davidof244 and 
McLean.245 Deputy President Rayment agreed with ASIC’s view that the trading in MINI warrants 
breached s 1041A.246 He rejected Mr McLean’s proposal to substitute the three year ban with a three 
year enforceable undertaking to avoid involvement in trading and/or market making, and his submission 
that he had lacked training for his trading role. In also dismissing Mr McLean’s submission that the 
three year ban would cause him personal financial hardship, Rayment DP emphasised the importance 
of deterring similar misconduct in the future and maintaining investor confidence in financial 
markets.247  
  
F. Non-compliance with Managed Investment Scheme laws   
One Tribunal case involved the consideration of numerous breaches of the Act relating to the operation 
of managed investment schemes. Hickie and ASIC [2013] AATA 853 Senior Member Fice affirmed 
ASIC’s two year banning of the former CEO of Lion Advantage (Lion), the responsible entity of four 
managed investment schemes. ASIC had also cancelled Lion’s AFS licence.248 SM Fice dismissed Mr 
Hickie’s attribution of his failures to lodge financial reports for the schemes with ASIC within the 
stipulated timeframes on advice he claimed to have received from Lion’s auditor, although he was 
unable to produce any evidence of such advice.249 He also rejected Mr Hickie’s attribution of these 
delays to property damage from the 2011 Brisbane floods – noting that the time of these floods Lion’s 
2009 financial reports were already 15 months late, and the 2010 financial reports were three months 
late.250 Rather, he determined the reason for Lion’s failure to have its financial reports completed, 
audited and lodged on time to be Mr Hickie’s desire to avoid qualified reports from Lion’s auditor; and 
also noted Mr Hickie had only belatedly lodged compliance plan audits following numerous requests 
from ASIC.251 The Tribunal also dismissed Mr Hickie’s explanation that Lion’s failure to hold the 
required professional indemnity insurances as required by its AFS Licence resulted from rejections by 
insurers – which he again could not substantiate through his evidence.252 The Tribunal noted with 
concern that Lion’s membership of an ASIC-approved External Dispute Resolution scheme as required 
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under its AFS Licence had lapsed due to Lion’s failure to pay membership fees.253 The multitude of 
these breaches led SM Fice to conclude that:  
‘… it is far simpler to add up the number of times which Lion did comply with its statutory 
obligations. Between 2005 and 2012, Lion complied with its statutory lodgement obligations 
on two occasions. It is fair to say, that over that eight year period, compliance was a rare event. 
Furthermore, the delays themselves were often lengthy, some exceeding two years and many 
exceeding 12 months. A number of documents were not lodged at all’.254  
After considering the guidelines in RG 98, SM Fice concluded that whilst there was only minimal 
detriment to Lion’s investors from Mr Hickie’s breaches, the need for specific and general deterrence 
justified ASIC’s two year ban.  
 
G. Impact of personal bankruptcy  
An interesting set of circumstances confronted the Tribunal in Vissenjoux and ASIC [2015] AATA 98. 
From 2010 to 2013 Mr Vissenjoux had been an Authorised Representative of an AFS Licensee, until 
he was prohibited under s 920A(1)(bb) by virtue of a sequestration order against his estate following 
the failure of his home construction business. This business collapsed owing $994,940 to 43 creditors 
(including $185,096 to the ATO), and with other creditors including tradespersons and suppliers.255 In 
affirming ASIC’s three year ban, SM Handley noted the consumer protection focus of Australia’s 
financial services laws.256 Whilst acknowledging that Mr Vissenjoux had experienced several personal 
problems issues shortly before his bankruptcy, and that he had worked in the financial services industry 
for 14 years without complaints,257 the Tribunal expressed serious concerns about his management of 
his other businesses – including using a single bank account for both his construction and financial 
services businesses, and his failure to lodge personal or business tax returns for six years before his 
bankruptcy.258 Another concern was his failure to appreciate the relevance of his bankruptcy to his 
ability to provide financial services – for instance during the Tribunal hearing he stated that: ‘… it just 
so happens in financial services, being bankrupt doesn't look as good. But so long as I'm not bankrupt 
for fraudulent reasons, I believe there's no issue’.259 In determining that Mr Vissenjoux had exhibited a 
disregard for his legal obligations for both his previous businesses, SM Handley concluded that public 
trust in the financial services industry would be undermined through allowing a bankrupt to act as a 
financial advisor, questioning ‘Realistically, how could any consumer or investor perceive him as 
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upholding his statutory obligations in professional practice when his personal financial management 
has been so poor?’. 260  
 
V. Conclusion: Assessing the practice of the AAT and the courts in reviewing s 920A banning 
orders   
 
Several observations may be drawn from the 50 AAT decisions on s 920A banning orders reviewed 
above.  
 
First, while the background circumstances of each of the cases have differed, on the whole the reasoning 
of the Tribunals exhibited a flexible approach in assessing the particular circumstances of each case and 
the need for future protection of consumers and investors from future repetitions of the misconduct in 
question. As Table B at the end of this article shows, on the whole the variations to the s 920A bans 
have been relatively minor.261  
 
Second, and following on from the first point above, ASIC’s RG 98 has been shown to be a useful guide 
in assisting in the determination of the appropriate length of s 920A banning orders – with most 
Tribunals consulting it, and none (as yet) criticising it. Although the AAT is not bound by the policies 
of the government agencies, it is recommend that when reviewing the merits of s 920A banning orders 
in the future, Tribunals should ensure that reference is made to RG 98 in order to ensure transparency 
in their reasoning.  
 
Third, whilst decisions of the AAT do not create binding precedents, several of the decisions examined 
in this article have provided some clarification on the preferable interpretation of these provisions. 
These have included XTWK and ASIC (2008) 105 ALD 596; [2008] AATA 703 (in relation to s 991F); 
Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 (in relation to s 1019G – although as noted in 
Part II of this article, s 1019G was subsequently amended) and Bond and ASIC (2009) 108 ALD 187; 
[2009] AATA 50 (in relation to s 1041A – with this clarification being provided by the FCA following 
                                                             
260 Vissenjoux and ASIC [2015] AATA 98 at [62]; [69] – [73]; [74] 
261 The exceptions to this general trend include the Tribunal decisions in Tweed and ASIC (2008) 47 AAR 518; 
[2008] AATA 514 (where the Tribunal set aside ASIC’s permanent ban); Dollas-Ford and ASIC (2006) 91 
ALD 747; [2006] AATA 704 (where the permanent ban was varied to four years); Fraser and ASIC [2011] 
AATA 944 (where the permanent ban was varied to six months); JTMJ and ASIC [2010] AATA 350 (where the 
Tribunal varied the 10 year ban to three years); George and ASIC [2014] AATA 167 (where the permanent ban 
was varied to three years); and Kofkin and ASIC [2009] AATA 660 (where the ban was varied from ten to three 
years. In all six of these cases the Tribunals were satisfied that the risk of future repetitions of the original 
misconduct was no longer present. However, in the cases reviewed in Part IV where ASIC’s original banning 
orders were affirmed, as well as those where the variations of the lengths of the bans were relatively minor, the 
AAT nevertheless showed a firm approach in upholding compliance with financial services laws and standards 
of professional conduct. 
 
 
ASIC’s appeal of the original Tribunal decision. Given that ASIC has been successful in all of the AAT 
decisions on s 920A that it has appealed in the FCA, it is suggested that ASIC should continue to appeal 
future Tribunal decisions which it considers to have mis-construed the applicable legislation. 
Furthermore, as illustrated in the recent case of ASIC v Davidof [2017] FCA 658 (discussed in Part II 
above), the definitional parameters of the term ‘financial product’ are likely to continue to evolve with 
new developments in financial markets. For this reason it is recommended that when imposing banning 
orders involving complex financial market concepts, ASIC should carefully articulate its interpretation 
of the applicable legislation at future Tribunal hearings to lessen the likelihood of further (potentially 
costly) appeals to the FCA.  
 
Fourth, the 2012 FOFA amendments to s 920A should be seen as positive reforms through expanding 
the grounds for ASIC to make banning orders. It is probable that the outcome in Tweed and ASIC (2008) 
47 AAR 518; [2008] AATA 514 would have differed if it was decided according to the post-2012 
wording of ss 920A(1)(g) and (h) – which added the grounds of a person being ‘involved in the 
contravention of a financial services law by another person’. Furthermore, the post-2012 wording of 
‘likely to contravene’ in s 920A(1)(f) sets a more flexible and workable standard for ASIC to satisfy 
when making banning orders to protect the public from the risk of future misconduct, and could well 
have resulted in a different outcome in De Souza and ASIC [2009] AATA 725. 
 
Finally, whilst ten applicants proposed enforceable undertakings (involving the applicants submitting 
to audits and/or supervision, and undertaking further training), the Tribunal decisions reviewed above 
showed a general preference to either vary or affirm the original bans rather than accepting enforceable 
undertakings. Nevertheless, the final section below considers whether these examples of the willingness 
of banned applicants to be subject to supervision, audits and/or further training might form the basis of 
a new regulatory response option for ASIC in cases where it determines that a banning order against a 
financial services provider is not warranted – but nevertheless has concerns about the provider’s 
competence and/or the likelihood of their future compliance with financial services laws. It is suggested 
that a minor addition to the 2017 Professional Standards Amendments might provide ASIC with this 
more flexible regulatory response option. 
 





As noted in Part I of this article, the 2017 Professional Standards Amendments will introduce significant 
changes to the educational standards to be a ‘relevant provider’;262 continuing professional development 
obligations and the requirements for ‘provisional’ relevant providers to be supervised until successfully 
completing a common entrance exam. It remains to be seen whether these new provisions will have the 
effect of lessening the scope for misconduct similar to the cases examined above to occur in the first 
instance – or conversely, whether these more extensive requirements may result in ASIC identifying 
more instances of misconduct and taking banning and/or other enforcement action after they come into 
effect on 1 January 2019.  
 
Although many of the Tribunal decisions examined above noted that banning orders can protect the 
public from the risk of future misconduct by financial services providers, the question remains about 
whether periods of banning result in any changes to the knowledge, skills and attitudes of the banned 
individuals. Twenty years ago in Re Kippe and ASC [1997] AATA 580 (which involved a three year 
banning order under s 829 of the former Corporations Law against a stockbroker who had operated 
accounts under false names and failed to advise clients of his personal interests in the shares he was 
trading for them), Forgie DP remarked that:  
 
‘Banning of itself will certainly have the effect of removing Mr Kippe from the industry and so 
protect the investing public during that time. More indirectly, it may protect the public by 
discouraging other dealer’s representatives from following his example. Whether or not it plays 
any part in changing his attitudes or in encouraging him to familiarise himself with the 
standards and laws he should follow remains to be seen’.263 [emphasis added]  
 
From 1 January 2019, s 921B(4) will require ‘provisional relevant providers’ to be supervised until they 
complete their professional year and pass an exam set by the ‘Standards Body’. The responsibilities of 
supervisors of provisional relevant providers will include approving in writing any SOAs to be provided 
to clients under s 921F(4); and assuming responsibility for advice provided by provisional relevant 
providers under s 921F(5). Section 910A will define a ‘provisional relevant provider’ as ‘a relevant 
provider who is undertaking work and training in accordance with subsection 921B(4)’. It is suggested 
that further legislative amendments could be made to enable ASIC to designate a relevant provider as 
a ‘provisional relevant provider’ in cases where the provider has engaged in misconduct which ASIC 
deems not sufficiently serious to warrant a banning order, but still has concerns about the future 
                                                             
262 Under the amended form of s 910A which will apply from 1 January 2019, the term ‘relevant provider’ will 
include employees, directors and authorised representatives of financial services licensees who are authorised to 
provide personal advice to retail clients. For an overview of these reforms, see Robin Bowley ‘ Regulating the 
financial advice profession: An examination of recent developments in Australia, New Zealand  and the United 
Kingdom and recommendations for further reform’ (2017) 36 University of Queensland Law Journal 191 - 193 
263 Re Kippe and ASC [1997] AATA 580 at [226] 
 
 
suitability about the provider. This “designation” power could also be used in conjunction with s 920A 
banning orders – for example through designating a relevant provider as a “provisional relevant 
provider” for a specified period upon the expiry of a period of banning.  
 
This suggested reform would provide three key benefits. First, a relevant provider designated as 
‘provisional’ could still continue working within the financial services industry, albeit under 
supervision. Secondly, it would afford some measure of protection to consumers and investors through 
subjecting the relevant provider designated as ‘provisional’ to the supervision requirements under the 
new s 921F which will apply from 1 January 2019. Thirdly, it would provide a mechanism for assessing 
the provisional relevant provider’s knowledge, skills and attitudes through the requirement to 
successfully complete an exam, and possibly further assessment processes such as a panel interview 
before the removal of the ‘provisional’ designation. This assessment mechanism would go some way 
towards addressing the doubts expressed in Re Kippe and ASC [1997] AATA 580 above about the 
potential for the banning orders to lead to a change of the knowledge, skills and attitudes of banned 
individuals. Furthermore, as the AAT may exercise all of the powers available to the original decision 
maker,264 this proposed power to designate a relevant provider as a “provisional relevant provider” 
would also increase the range of options available to the Tribunal when determining challenges to s 
920A banning orders.  
 
Examples of cases reviewed in Part II of this article where this option of requiring the individuals to 
either undertake further training, or to be subject to enhanced supervision, could have been beneficial 
in lessening the scope for further breaches include Hayes and ASIC [2006] AATA 1506; (2006) 93 
ALD 494 and Prasad and ASIC [2016] AATA 384 (where the advisers had failed to have an adequately 
documented basis for their advice to their clients); George and ASIC [2014] AATA 167 (where the 
adviser falsified documentation for loan approvals – although the Tribunal was satisfied that Mr 
George’s extenuating personal circumstances contributed to this misconduct); and Amargianitakis and 
ASIC [2015] AATA 720 (where the adviser failed to properly assess his clients’ financial objectives 
before they invested in high-risk property financing schemes). 
 
With the major changes to the regulation of professional standards in the financial services industry 
coming into effect from 1 January 2019, which could well lead to increased enforcement action by 
ASIC, it is recommended that serious consideration should be given to enacting the reforms suggested 
above in order to further enhance the flexibility and effectiveness of ASIC’s regulatory toolkit.  
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Table 2:  Summary of AAT determinations on challenges to s 920A banning orders  
 
Tribunal decision  
s 920A / NCCPA s 80 limbs 
invoked by ASIC 
Corporations Act 2001 and 
other provisions considered ASIC ban AAT ban Difference 
Final 
outcome 
Nolan [2006] AATA 778  920A(1)(f) 
787 (now repealed), 921A(1), 
ASICA s 12DA  5 years  3 years 2 years Varied 
Hayes [2006] AATA 1506 920A(1)(e), (f) 945A, 946C, 947D 3 years  1 year 2 years Varied 
Dollas-Ford [2006] AATA 704 920A(1)(e), (f) 1041G Permanent 4 years Significant Varied 
Franke [2008] AATA 83  920A(1)(e), (f) 946A, 946C and 947B  2 years 2 years Nil Affirmed 
Coakley [2008] AATA 247 920A(1)(e), (f) 727(1), 911C, 1041E 4 years 4 years Nil Affirmed 
Howarth [2008] AATA 278  920A(1)(c), (f) 
1041F, 1041G; Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) s 72; Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic) ss 81(4), 82 Permanent Permanent  Nil Affirmed 
Tweed [2008] AATA 514 920A(1)(e), (f) 1041H, 1019E, 1019G, 1019I Permanent Nil Significant Set aside  
XTWK [2008] AATA 703 920A(1)(e), (f) 991F; ASX Market Rule 7.8.2 3 years  Nil 3 years Set aside  
Moore [2008] AATA 1164  920A(1)(c)  ASICA s 64(1)(b) 18 months 18 months Nil Affirmed 
Bond [2009] AATA 50  920A(1)(f) 1041A 5 years  5 years  Nil Affirmed 
Lelliott [2009] AATA 110  920A(1)(e)   1041H(1) 2 years 9 months 15 months Varied 
Turner [2009] AATA 417  920A(1)(e), (f) 
947C(2)(f)(i)-(ii), 942C(2)(g), 
1041H  6 years  6 years Nil Affirmed 
Eikelboom [2009] AATA 474 920A(1)(e), (f) 945A 3 years  2 years 1 year Varied 
Musumeci [2009] AATA 524 920A(1)(e) 1041A  4 years  2 years 2 years Varied 
Littlemore [2009] AATA 679  920A(1)(e) 911A 1 year  7 months 5 months Varied 
Kofkin [2009] AATA 660  920A(1)(e) 945A  10 years  3 years 7 years Varied 
De Souza [2009] AATA 725  920A(1(f) 1041H 2 years  Nil 2 years Set aside  
Mackenzie [2009] AATA 1003  920A(1)(e) 1043A(1)(d) 3 years  3 years Nil Affirmed 
YFFM [2010] AATA 340  920A(1)(f) 1043A(1), (2) 5 years  5 years  Nil Affirmed 
JTMJ [2010] AATA 350  920A(1)(f) 1041A, 1041B, 1041H  10 years  3 years 7 years Varied 
 
 
Tribunal decision  
s 920A / NCCPA s 80 limbs 
invoked by ASIC 
Corporations Act 2001 and 
other provisions considered ASIC ban AAT ban Difference 
Final 
outcome 
Rosenberg [2010] AATA 654 920A(1)(e) 1041B, 1041H 4 years  Nil 4 years Set aside  
Fuoco [2010] AATA 739 920A(1)(e) 945A, 947C; ASICA s 12DA 5 years  5 years  Nil Affirmed 
Klusman [2011] AATA 150 920A(1)(e)  1041A; s 1041B; s 1041H  3 years  3 years  Nil Affirmed 
Fraser [2011] AATA 944 920A(1)(c)  1041G, 1041H Permanent 6 months Significant Varied 
Nguyen [2012] AATA 156  920A(1)(e), (f)  
945S, 946A, 946C, 1012D, 
947D, 1041E, 1041F, 1041H 7 years  7 years  Nil Affirmed 
Caines [2012] AATA 289  920A(1)(e),(bb), (f) 947C 5 years  5 years  Nil Affirmed 
Seagrim [2012] AATA 583  920A(1)(e), (f) 
912A, 912D(1B), 941B, 942C, 
945A, 947C 3 years  6 months 2.5 years Varied 
Hickie [2013] AATA 853 920A(1)(e) 319, 601HG, 601FD, 912D(1B) 2 years 2 years Nil Affirmed 
Tarrant [2013] AATA 926 920A(1)(e), (f) 
945A(1), 947B(2)(d), 
947C(2)(e), 1041E(1), 
1041H(1)  7 years  7 years Nil Affirmed 
George [2014] AATA 167 
920A(1)(d), (da);                     
NCCPA s 80(1)(f) No contraventions noted Permanent  3 years Significant Varied 
Coshott [2014] AATA 677  920A(1)(d), (da), (e), (f), (g)  1041G, 1041H  Permanent Permanent  Nil Affirmed 
Liu [2014] AATA 817  
920A(1)(d), (da), (e), (f), (g), 
(h) 
1012B, 1012C, 1021B, 1041G, 
1041H  Permanent Permanent  Nil Affirmed 
Vissenjoux [2015] AATA 98 920A(1)(bb), (d) Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 269 3 years  3 years  Nil Affirmed 
Amargianitakis [2015] AATA 720 920A(1) (da), (e),  (g), (f) 
941A, 941B, 945A, 946A, 
946B, 1041H 8 years  6 years  2 years Varied 
Wittensleger [2015] AATA 902 920A(1)(c); NCCPA s 80(1)(c) Criminal Code (WA) s 409(1) Permanent  Permanent  Nil Affirmed 
Chong [2016] AATA 338 920A(1)(e)  
945A, 946A, 946C, 947C, 
1041H 5 years  5 years Nil Affirmed 
Prasad [2016] AATA 384  920A(1)(da), (e) 961B, 961G, 946A, 947C  3 years 18 months 1.5 years Varied 
Sahay [2016] AATA 583 920A(1)(c); NCCPA s 80(1)(c) No contraventions noted Permanent  Permanent Nil Affirmed 
Parker [2016] AATA 983  
920A(1)(d), (e), (f), (g), (h); 
NCCPA s 80(1)(d), (e), (f) 
1041H; ASICA s 12DA; 
NCCPA s 33  Permanent  Permanent Nil Affirmed 
 
 
Tribunal decision  
s 920A / NCCPA s 80 limbs 
invoked by ASIC 
Corporations Act 2001 and 
other provisions considered ASIC ban AAT ban Difference 
Final 
outcome 
McCormack [2016] AATA 1021  920A(1)(e), (g) 1041H 5 years  Nil 5 years Affirmed 
Chapple [2016] AATA 1032 920A(1)(c)  
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 
178BA, 192E  Permanent  Permanent Nil Affirmed 
Batros [2017] AATA 399 920A(1)(e ) 1043A 5 years  5 years Nil Affirmed 
O'Sullivan [2017] AATA 644 920A(1)(e ) 728, 1041H 7 years  7 years Nil Affirmed 
JSKN [2017] AATA 818 
920A(1)(c), (d); NCCPA s 
80(1)(c) NCCPA s 160D Permanent  Permanent  Nil Affirmed 
Downey [2017] AATA 958 920A(1)(e ) 1041H 6 years  4 years 2 years Varied 
Panganiban [2017] AATA 1026 920A  961G Permanent  Permanent  Nil  Affirmed 
Sweeney [2017] AATA 2182 920A(1)(e ); (g) 1041H 2 years 2 years Nil Affirmed 
McLean [2017] AATA 2566 920A(1)(e); (g) 1041A 3 years  3 years Nil Affirmed 
Seymour [2017] AATA 2581 920A(1)(e) 1041H 3 years 3 years Nil  Affirmed 
Davidof [2017] AATA 2594 920A(1)(e) 761D, 764A 3 years  3 years Nil Affirmed 
 
 
